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31 JULY 1986

## Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

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31 JULY 1986

## WORLDWIDE REPORT

## ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: SDI MEANT TO EXHAUST SOVIET ECONOMY, NOT PROTECT U.S.

LD022207 Moscow TASS in English 2143 GMT 2 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 2 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev

In conditions of the growing opposition to the U.S. "star wars" programme, also from scientists engaged in the creation of the space-based anti-missile defence system and in the U.S. Congress, the Pentagon is making desperate attempts to embellish the results of the implementation of "Strategic Defence Initiative," to present SDI as a successful, and therefore irreversible process, that cannot be arrested or revised.

U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger announced another test of experimental "flag" vehicle ("flexible lightweight agile guided experiment"), that destroyed a target moving over three times the speed of sound at the altitude of 13 thousand metres. He took this occasion to attack members of the Congress who had cut the appropriations asked by the administration for "star wars."

Meanwhile American specialists, summing up the results of three years of work on SDI, arrived at the conclusion that the United States large-scale anti-missile defence will be, at best, an umbrella with holes which might serve as a protection against drizzle, but not against a missile torrent of a retaliatory strike at the aggressor. In a petition referred to the U.S. Congress, 16 hundred American scientists, among them many of those who are busy creating weapons systems in governmental laboratories, described SDI as a senseless waste of funds which, moreover, threatens to intensify the arms race.

No matter what SDI might give as far as lasers and beam weapons are concerned, offensive armaments with the passage of time will take care of Reagan's rail guns, the U.S. "TIME" magazine admits. It writes that counter-measures to anti-missile defence will, apparently, be more efficient. In all likelihood, SDI in the long run will cost more to the USA than counter-measures will cost to the Soviet Union.

Having assumed the course at the achievement of military supremacy, the present U.S. Administration tries to involve the Soviet Union in costly space ventures and to exhaust it as far as the economy goes. Consultant to the U.S. President, "father of the U.S. hydrogen bomb" Edward Teller, revealing precisely this purpose of the "star wars" programme, declared outright that if the Soviet Union follows the United States example and starts creating anti-missile defence systems in space, then SDI could be regarded as justified.

One can draw the conclusion that the apologists of "star wars" in Washington fear much more the successful implementation of the plans of the development of the Soviet economy than the alleged "menace" of Soviet missiles. Washington's calculations that the Soviet Union will take the U.S. bait and will be acting to ensure its security on the basis of the Pentagon's scenario rest on sand.

Soviet leaders stressed more than once that the Soviet Union's answer to the creation by the United States of a large-scale anti-missile defence system with space-basing elements will be effective and less costly than the United States SDI. The answer will be given within a shorter period of time and not necessarily in space. The already existing weapon systems -- submarine-launched ballistic missiles with a low trajectory, cruise missiles, bombers and so on, to say nothing of new weapon systems -- will be an effective counter-measure to the deployment of the U.S. anti-missile defence strike systems in space.

The Reagan administration can enable the U.S. military-industrial elite to make a fast buck on the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" at the expense of the American tax-payers. But the multi-tier nuclear space umbrella of the U.S. anti-missile defence, which is nevertheless an umbrella with holes, might prove to be a boomerang which will hit the U.S. economy, not the Soviet economy, and which will, moreover, aggravate the problems of the United States security.

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CSO: 5200/1463

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS REPORTS WEINBERGER STATEMENT ON 27 JUNE MISSILE TEST

LD021544 Moscow TASS in English 1531 GMT 2 Jul 86

[Text] Washington July 2 TASS -- U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said at a press conference here that another test of the experimental flexible lightweight agile guided weapon had been tested on June 27 under the Strategic Defense Initiative. The weapon hit a target flying at three and a half times the speed of sound, which had been launched from a plane at an altitude of 13,200 metres and destroyed at an altitude of 3,600 metres. The U.S. thus took another step towards the militarization of space.

The Pentagon chief characterized the results of the experiment at the first fruit of the SDI research and made it clear that the practical implementation phase was already being initiated. Weinberger confirmed that the Reagan administration had assumed a course of clearing every obstacle from the path of the runaway arms race. Asked if the Defense Department was opposed to continued compliance with the SALT-2 commitments, the secretary said that by the President's decision, the Pentagon is buying all the weapons it needs without regard for the treaty constraints.

Commenting on the flag test, THE WASHINGTON POST says that the "star wars" program has come under criticism in U.S. Congress.

Even the Senate committee on armed services, usually a staunch supporter of the Pentagon programs, is doubtful about the SDI goals as they are formulated by the Defense Department, the newspaper says.

Former Senator Paul Tsongas said in an interview to THE BOSTON GLOBE that the "star wars" program was flawed both technologically and strategically. The newspaper says that even a public opinion poll conducted by the sworn enemy of the nuclear freeze movement, the Committee on the Present Danger, showed that 70 per cent of the population supported a bilateral arms freeze.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### USSR: WEINBERGER SPACE RESEARCH FOUNDATION SPEECH CRITICIZED

PM091109 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jul 86 Second Edition p 3

[A. Matvyev "Rejoinder": "Beyond His Understanding?..."]

[Text] "True enough, whom God wants to punish, he first makes mad." These words of Gogol's city governor sprang to mind on reading the text of U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger's speech at a conference of the Space Research Foundation, although this speech, devoted to a glorification of the "star wars" program, was no more insane than all the others. The point is simply that this time the Pentagon chief himself reported on a severe weakening of his mental capacities. Attacking those who do not share his militarist positions, he stated that their views are beyond his, Weinberger's understanding. Yet it was a question of very simple things. Judge for yourselves.

"SDI, we are assured, is impracticable, it will be... destabilizing, and will give impetus to the arms race in space," Weinberger argues. "But how a technically impracticable military system can at the same time be destabilizing is incomprehensible to me." And more. "Certain people in Congress are still trying to kill off our highly promising research in the strategic defense spheres, and the same group of people demand the observance of an arms treaty (the SALT II treaty -- editor's note), which... is fundamentally flawed. How can you reject what inspires hope, and hold on to what is flawed? That is beyond my understanding," the Pentagon chief wonders, not without pathos.

In reality there is nothing "incomprehensible" about what Weinberger is discussing. For some years now work has been in progress in the United States to create space strike arms under the so-called "strategic defense initiative." This "star wars" program, the Pentagon dreams, would guarantee the impunity of American nuclear aggression against the USSR by shielding the United States from a retaliatory strike. Many scientists and military specialists in various countries believe that such an antimissile defense system cannot be effective. Especially since the USSR will not sit idly by and watch people across the ocean creating space weapons. In order to restore equilibrium the Soviet Union will be forced to take the necessary measures to neutralize the electronic-space "star wars" machine which the Americans are creating. That is why one can say that the objectives of the "strategic defense initiative" are unattainable.

But in itself this program is highly dangerous and destabilizing, even today. And not only because its implementation leads to a new spiral in the arms race. The creation of an ABM system with space-based components could give the Pentagon strategists the illusion of being able to act with impunity. After all, they regard SDI as an element

in their first nuclear strike strategy. In the hope that this program will be realized, the Pentagon has embarked on an unrestrained buildup of offensive nuclear arms: MX ballistic missiles, Trident missile-carrying submarines, strategic aircraft, cruise missiles.

But the SALT II treaty was hampering the Pentagon people. So Washington declared the treaty to be "flawed," and the United States refused to observe it. As you can see, the renunciation of SALT II is directly connected with the "star wars" program. And of course there is nothing surprising in the fact that the very people who are opposed to SDI are demanding the observance of the SALT II treaty. And Weinberger is evidently well aware of all that. He is only feigning "incomprehension." But as people so rightly say: He who will not open his eyes, cannot see.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### SOVIET COLONEL CRITICIZES U.S. POLLING, 'PROPAGANDA' ON SDI

PM081556 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 86 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Yuryev article: "Propaganda Tricksters, or How the United States Justifies Plans To Implement the 'Star Wars' Program"]

[Text] Half a century ago the Soviet writers I. Ilf and Ye. Petrov voted in "One-Story America": "America is a country that loves primitive clarity in all its affairs and ideas... Americans love figures. Figures will convince them more easily than anything." The fact that this love is alive and well today and being used by some people for ignoble ends can easily be seen in the example of the raucous propaganda campaign around the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI).

The role of coordinator and producer of ideas has been allocated to the White House "think tank" -- the "Heritage Foundation." Americans' attitudes toward SDI were studied not long ago on the orders of this ultraconservative organization. The conclusion was that "90 percent of those polled supported the program and only 4 percent were against it." The figures about the support by the "overwhelming majority" of Americans for the "star wars" plans were immediately put into propaganda circulation.

Slightly later, however, information reached the press that in order to achieve such high percentages the pollsters used very dubious methods, to put it mildly. This, for instance, is how they posed the main question: "Do you want the U.S. Government to defend America from Soviet missiles?" Naturally, most of those polled answered in the affirmative. However, when the Americans were asked: "Do you support the 'star wars' program?" only 33 percent said "yes." Most of them, as became clear, were completely unaware that back in 1972 the United States had pledged under the ABM Treaty not to develop [sozdavat], test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-, air-, space-, or mobile land-based.

However, it is becoming increasingly harder to delude their own people and the world public with primitive arithmetic alone. That is why in addition to the figure-juggling, certain "philosophical" and "scientific" arguments that allegedly justify the frenzied militarist policy pursued by the current administration are being put forward. The "philosophers'" meditations are increasingly paraded for discussion at various symposiums and seminars organized by the same "Heritage Foundation."

In order to give the propaganda campaign still greater scope organizations such as "High Frontier" and the "Coalition for the Strategic Defense Initiative" have tirelessly published pseudoscientific [naukoobraznyy] brochures and booklets, issued press releases, held press conferences, in short, utilized any opportunity to "help" ordinary Americans to form "their own viewpoint" through the mass media.

Nor is Washington averse to the fabrications -- long since exposed but still used -- that the Soviet Union constantly violates any commitments and should not be dealt with, much less entered into any kind of agreement with. "Russian territory is far too vast and that is why the Soviet Union is bound to retain some kind of nuclear weapon hidden in forest bunkers or silos, or camouflaged in ordinary warehouses," is how THE WALL STREET JOURNAL scared its countrymen.

Those are just certain examples of the dishonest propaganda game being conducted overseas with a view to justifying the cranking up of the arms race and its transfer to space. The propaganda liars hide the truth about "star wars" from the American public and build all arguments in their defense on shameless disinformation. That is the way the White House tries to justify its adventurist course aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and turning peaceful space into an arena for a destructive war.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: ABRAHAMSON STATEMENT ON EXPERIMENTS SHOWS SDI OFFENSIVE

LD272021 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 27 Jun 86

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS -- TASS news analyst Vasiliy Kharkov writes:

Experiments to develop new weapons systems under the "star wars" program will be conducted at the Falcon Base in Colorado, the headquarters of the space command center of the U.S. Air Force. The base will be expanded and modernized for the purpose, General James Abrahamson, who supervises the organization set up by the Pentagon to implement the Strategic Defense Initiative, announced in Washington on Thursday. This is fresh evidence that Washington intends to go ahead with "star wars" preparations and to make them irreversible, which means the escalation of the arms race and obstacles to real disarmament, economic progress and peaceful cooperation in space exploration.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the "star wars" concept, contrary to the White House arguments, does not generate the least impetus to nuclear arms reduction. Conversely, it encourages the escalation of nuclear arms arsenals. The SDI proponents are trying to pass off that program as purely research endeavors. They also falsely claim that a "defensive shield" will be created in this way. General Abrahamson's announcement, however, gives the lie to these arguments. The laboratories and proving grounds working on SDI are developing and testing offensive weaponry for outer space.

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CSO: 5200/1463

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### USSR'S BOVIN CALLS EUREKA 'ANTITHESIS' of SDI

Lp062025 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 6 Jul 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Aleksandr Bovin]

[Text] Hello, comrades! Let us begin with European affairs. The third conference on the European Eureka research program took place in London on Monday. Let me recall that Eureka came into being as an antithesis to that initiative of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. It came into being at the suggestion of the French, and their logic was as follows: Western Europe is not noticeably behind the United States in the field of modern technology; The star wars program might whip up scientific and technical progress even further in the United States, and Europe will fall further behind in order to prevent this from happening it is essential to unite the efforts of Western European states and for a European technological community to be created, as they say. And Eureka is indeed setting such a course. In practical terms it looks like this: Those taking part in Eureka jointly select the most topical and promising projects from their point of view, in, say, the field of laser technology, computers, biotechnology, robot technology and so on. They then agree about who and which firms are going to take part in which projects, who is going to pay and how much. And they start work.

There are already 19 countries -- that is to say, the 12 member-countries of the EEC, then Norway, Sweden, and Finland, then Switzerland, Austria, and Turkey, and now at the London meeting Iceland, too, has joined. So there are already 19 countries taking part. There have been indications in the world press that Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the GDR are showing interest in working within the Eureka framework. I do not know whether there has been formal discussion of this question in London, but essentially the general opinion there is evidently such that -- as one newspaper wrote -- it will be limited to a circle of countries that have identical ideas about the supreme values. Here, I think, any commentary would be superfluous.

Well, in addition to the 10 such projects already approved, a further 62 projects were accepted for development in London. France is showing the greatest level of activity here: France is taking part in 39 projects; Britain is taking part in 29, and so on. It is interesting that when this Eureka idea was put forward, they made the following distinction in Paris between Eureka and SDI. They put it like this: SDI is a military program which has a civilian application, a civilian use; while Eureka is a civilian program with a capability of military application. It is a fairly fine distinction, and where it is fine it is capable of breaking down, and recently there has clearly

been a stepping up of interest precisely in the military aspects of Eureka. And the idea of a European defense initiative which has Washington's active support provides a new impulse to thinking in that direction. The West European military-industrial complex is also pushing in the same direction, the more so in view of the fact that such giants as Siemens, Philips, Thomson want simultaneously to participate in both Eureka and in SDI. So it is possible for fairly noticeable shifts in priorities to take place here and for these military aspects to be intensified.

In general, however, the people engaged in Eureka are serious people and it is a serious matter, and it is precisely this that underlines the urgent need for joint work at the frontiers of scientific and technical progress to be urged within the CEMA framework.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

POSSIBLE CANADIAN SPACE RESEARCH LINK TO SDI DISCUSSED

Associate Defense Minister Andre

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 17 Jun 86 p A17

[Text]

OTTAWA (CP) — The government will not stop the Canadian Forces from doing research on a satellite-based sensor system, despite allegations that it could be used as part of the Star Wars program, a cabinet minister says.

Associate Defence Minister Harvie Andre told the House of Commons yesterday that research into the so-called Teale Ruby sensor system has been going on since 1980.

It will not stop now, Andre said, even though the government has said it will not be involved directly in the Star Wars anti-missile system planned by the United States.

The government thinks that "it is in Canada's interest to be up to date on the latest technology, including satellite observation,"

Andre said.

He told Liberal MP William Rompkey that it would be foolish to stop work on a promising technology, and suggested that Teale Ruby would have many peaceful uses, as well as protecting the Canadian North and detecting hostile aircraft.

On Friday, Dalhousie University professor Joel Sokolsky, a defence specialist, said the military's involvement in Teale Ruby "comes close to direct government-to-government involvement" in research on Star Wars.

Teale Ruby can be used to track manned bombers, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles or satellites. Canada is believed to be supplying targets for its sensors, and analyzing data from tests.

TORONTO STAR Editorial

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 23 Jun 86 p A16

[Editorial]

[Text]

Viewed through military eyes, "Teale Ruby" is a harmless Pentagon experiment in which an infra-red sensor, stationed on a satellite, will try to spot the exhaust plumes of aircraft, missiles or bombers flying far below. But because the project has at least an indirect link to Washington's contentious Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), Ottawa's role in Teale Ruby makes us uneasy.

Last year, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney wisely rejected a direct Canadian government role in Star Wars, as SDI is popularly known. In saying "No, thanks" to U.S. President Ronald Reagan's invitation to join in Star Wars, Mulroney was sending a message that Canada remains an advocate of arms control, not arms escalation.

But the investment in Teale Ruby by our Department of National Defence — \$2 million worth so far — undercuts that valuable message. Sure, the Pentagon classifies Teale Ruby as no more than a "related technology" not under the direct control of the SDI bureaucracy. But what's to keep it that way?

Parliamentary critics such as New Democrat MP Derek Blackburn have a point when they warn that Teale Ruby could be transferred to the Star Wars program with the stroke of an accountant's pen in future U.S. budgets. If that were to happen, Mulroney's decision to keep Canada officially out of Star Wars would lose all credibility.

To be fair, the Mulroney government played no part in Ottawa's decision to fund Teale Ruby. The original commitment was made in 1981, when Pierre Trudeau was prime minister. Now, the satellite experiment is grounded until the Americans regain their space legs after the Challenger shuttle tragedy. That gives Mulroney time to re-think Canada's participation.

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CSO: 5220/43

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: U.S. 'NOT IN THE LEAST INTERESTED' IN DISARMAMENT

LD012128 Moscow TASS in English 1750 GMT 1 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 1 TASS -- By TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev.

Ever since coming to power in 1980, the Reagan administration has not undertaken a single step towards disarmament. On the contrary, it has been pursuing a policy of building up the U.S. nuclear potential, first of all nuclear one, with a view to gaining an edge over the Soviet Union.

The administration frustrates all chances, however slight, to achieve agreements with the Soviet Union on limiting and reducing armaments.

In order to justify the course toward accelerating the arms race, the American ruling circles have resorted to overt demagoguery and deception of the American public by claiming that the U.S. is lagging behind the Soviet Union in military might and that America is in greater danger than on the following day after Pearl Harbor.

That is not merely rhetoric, but a carefully planned attempt to cover up the implementation of a new programme for building up first-strike weapons.

There have emerged the concepts of "window of vulnerability" and "disarmament through arms buildup" -- a comprehensive programme of strategic arms buildup (October 1981).

In March 1983, the "star wars" programme was proclaimed, innocuously wrapped up as "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI).

All that was accompanied by the rumpus about the mythical "Soviet military threat". If Washington officials did speak about disarmament, what they implied was exclusively the demand for the USSR's unilateral disarmament.

The Soviet proposals for limiting and reducing armaments, including conventional, nuclear strategic, medium-range and chemical, and for ending nuclear blasts are dismissed by Washington as "propaganda", which attests to the U.S. Administration's apparent unwillingness to handle disarmament issues in earnest.

The latest decision by the White House chief to break out of the Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive arms -- the 1972 interim agreement and the SALT-2 treaty -- became the most obvious evidence of the U.S. leaders' obstructionist policy in the field of arms reduction.



Once these agreements are breached by Washington, there will remain no treaty mechanisms restraining to a certain extent the nuclear arms buildup.

This is precisely what they in Washington seek to achieve -- to eliminate everything that stands in the way of the unchecked buildup of weapons of mass annihilation.

U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, in his recent interview with the West German newspaper DIE WELT, said that the U.S. was going ahead with the restoration of its potential of deterrence, in other words, building up first-strike systems.

This confirms again that Washington is not going to give up the unbridled arms race, and is not in the least interested in disarmament issues.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: U.S. SEEKS SUPERIORITY, NOT EUROPEAN SECURITY

LD071641 Moscow TASS in English 1618 GMT 7 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 7 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

In spite of many-year debates on the nuclear problem in Europe, the situation on the continent continues to grow worse.

U.S. nuclear missiles with a flight time of 8-12 minutes to vital targets in European socialist countries continue to be deployed in the territories of a number of NATO members. This means that in a crisis situation life-and-death decisions will have to be taken within a matter of minutes. The danger of nuclear catastrophe is dramatically escalated by possible malfunctions in early-warning and communication systems or by misread intentions of the other side. The dramatic destabilization of the military and political situation can eventually lead to uncontrollable situation and an all-out nuclear war.

The Pentagon has complemented its ertswhile concept of a "limited" nuclear war in Europe with an equally dangerous "star wars" strategy. Under Washington's illusory but dangerous plans, an anti-missile shield over the USA should guarantee impunity to the aggressor as it unleashes a nuclear conflict in the European theatre, far from U.S. territory.

Washington's military-political strategy is aimed at making the European pay for the consequences of American armed ventures. Yet the governments of the European NATO countries are yielding more and more often to Washinton's pressure and sacrificing their own security interests to "Atlantic solidarity."

The solution of the problem of West European security now depends not on whether the U.S. Administration is prepared "to sacrifice Washington or New York to defend Paris or London" -- this is a far-fetched dilemma. Continued peace and stability in Europe depend, inter alia, on whether Washington secures a situation in which it will be able to sacrifice even more flagrantly the national interests of France, Britain or West Germany to threaten Moscow, Warsaw or Berlin.

Washington's objections to the Soviet proposals on the elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe are by no means explained by any "linkage between U.S. and West European security." As a matter of fact, the White House has no use for any measures contribution to the normalization of the military and political situation in Europe or for agreements that would stand in the way of the United States as it chases military superiority.

The U.S. Administration has been trying to convince the world public for five years now that the only dependable road to disarmament goes through the uncontrollable buildup of the U.S. nuclear arms arsenals and that a ban on chemical weapons is only possible if Western Europe is saturated with American binary munitions. White House officials claim that nuclear testing can be ended only if the United States intensively carries on such tests. Even the rhetoric of official Washington shows how dangerous it is to let the American militarists decide the fate of the world as they see fit.

The world public has every right to hope that common sense will prevail in Washington and that the U.S. reply to the Soviet proposals on stronger peace and stability in Europe will proceed from the genuine interests of the Europeans and from the principles of equality and equal security of the sides.

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CSO: 5200/1459

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MOSCOW: REAGAN 'PLAYING FOR TIME' ON SOVIET PROPOSALS

LDO61648 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 6 Jul 86

[Report by Soviet television political observer Valentin Zorin; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Numerous international press commentaries are devoted to statements by President Reagan, who has acknowledged the serious nature of the new Soviet proposals concerning nuclear arms reductions and, in connection with this, has again raised the issue of a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. We now go to Soviet television Political Observer Valentin Zorin:

[Zorin] Hello, Comrades. Indeed, after many months of silence and frankly, of negative reaction to the important steps taken by the Soviet Union in the last few months directed at fundamentally improving the international situation, new sounds can be heard from the U.S. capital. This time the Soviet proposals have been assessed as positive and seen as creating a basis for negotiation. Well, it goes without saying that such a turn, if indeed we are talking about a turn and not a maneuver, cannot fail to give rise to a positive attitude. One would like to hope that in the end a sober assessment of the situation and a sense of responsibility and state wisdom will prevail in Washington. However, one has to note that the words articulated in the U.S. capital have not yet been backed by deeds.

Well, let us take, for example the latest round of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, which have recently concluded in Geneva. While the Soviet delegation in the course of these negotiations submitted detailed, balanced proposals, taking into consideration the interests of both sides, which could form a good basis for resolving in the immediate future the issue of ending the arms race and radical cuts in nuclear weapons, the U.S. side has not budged an inch from the old, unconstructive and unrealistic positions.

One more fact: Soon a year will have passed since the Soviet Union stopped conducting nuclear tests, thus manifesting its genuine goodwill. Explosions continue to roar at the nuclear testing ground in Nevada. This again is an instance of when deeds speak, literally and figuratively, more loudly than words.

Another circumstance that is difficult to ignore is that while the President makes his declarations in a positive spirit, his closest colleagues, such as Pentagon chief Weinberger and other high-ranking Washington figures, say quite the opposite, continuing to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria. How is one to interpret this? What conclusions is one to draw from that kind of deliberate dissonance?

Nor can one agree with those official Washington representatives who are now clearly trying to play for time by maintaining that Washington will need, you see, weeks if not months for a response to the Soviet proposals, which they themselves assessed as constructive. Defining the Soviet Union's position in connection with the new trends in Washington, if indeed such exist, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed in his Warsaw speech: We shall welcome it only if Washington begins to treat the problems of disarmament more seriously and responsibly. We hope the U.S. Administration will join in our initiatives and make it possible to hold a meeting and work out accords the people are awaiting with hope. They do not await them some time in the distant future but immediately, because wasting time in the present era is indeed akin to dying."

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## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: NATO SUBMITS TO U.S. 'DIKTAT' ON SDI, EUROMISSILES

LD011906 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT 1 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 1 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

In the recent period some West European countries have been going through a strange metamorphosis: As their share of the world economy grows, the role of their governments in ensuring national security and resolving the global problems of war and peace drops dramatically.

The European NATO governments more and more often yield to Washington's pressure and timidly join, under the pretext of "Bolstering Atlantic unity," U.S. military and political ventures which are against their own national interests.

The British government set a dangerous precedent in relations with developing countries by having allowed to use American bases in British territory for a piratic raid of U.S. bombers on Libyan cities and communities. The European NATO countries actually gave the green light to the deployment of new American chemical weapons in their territories. By consenting to cooperate with the Pentagon in the fulfilment of the U.S. "star wars" program, the governments of West Germany and Britain are becoming active accomplices of the U.S. administration in the violation of the ABM treaty and in the subversion of the entire process of arms limitation and reduction.

The West German government recently took the decision to build cruise missiles domestically. Meanwhile, West Germany has no artificial earth satellites, which are needed to comprise programs for the flights of cruise missiles. Bonn then will have to use U.S. "help" and West Germany will thus depend entirely on the USA in the use of those missiles. Naturally, it will be Washington rather than Bonn that will decide on targets for those missiles.

At the same time Washington could not have cared less for the national security interests of its European allies. Giving an interview to the AP, Stansfield Turner, citing his personal experience as CIA director and an analysis of the strategic situation, said that the United States was not going to sacrifice Washington or New York to defend Japan or Europe.

A correspondent of DIE WELT of West Germany asked British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe the other day: "British opposition recently called Mrs. Thatcher President Reagan's poodle meaning that when Reagan gives a whistle she jumps. Does your government back the American president always?" The British minister could only reply

acidly that Britain's view of the importance of the U.S. to the North Atlantic alliance in Europe was virtually identical with that of West Germany. To put it in other words, you are another.

Addressing the 10th congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, gave a realistic appraisal of the role assigned by Washington to its European allies in the pursuit of foreign policy. "One cannot help regretting the fact that the governments of the other NATO countries, including those which in words dissociate themselves from the dangerous extremes of American policy, eventually yield to pressure from the other side of the ocean and thus take upon themselves a share of responsibility for the escalation of the arms race."

The peoples of the world, including the West Germans, Britons and other peoples of the European NATO countries, would not at all like American imperialism to decide the destinies of peace as it pleases. The world community hopes that the responsible politicians of Western Europe will at long last realize the danger of the unconditional submission to Washington's diktat in questions of war and peace.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: U.S. ABM, MX, SUBMARINE, BOMBER PROGRAMS ASSAILED

PM011349 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 86 Second Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Observer V. Pustov "Military-Political Review": "Washington: A Policy of Recklessness"]

[Text] As the well known proverb says, words are not sparrows: If they fly away, you cannot catch them. Well, of course that is true, but...Sometimes you cannot help wondering, what do sparrows have to do with it? Especially when the word that "flies away" sounds less like harmless twittering than the threatening shriek of a hawk. Here is an example. "The U.S. nuclear potential must be stronger even in the conditions of a protracted war," Pentagon chief C. Weinberger proclaims.

This barely disguised admission of the desire for military superiority takes on a still more sinister meaning against the gloomy background of the Washington administration's refusal to stop nuclear tests and observe the provisions of SALT II, and also in the context of the intensifying attacks by Weinberger and his colleagues on the ABM Treaty. The gamble on strength is also confirmed by the accelerated buildup of both nuclear and conventional arms. Both are taking place with the intention of disrupting the military equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and undermining the strategic stability that exists in the world.

The White House recently published a so-called fact sheet in connection with the President's message to Congress on U.S. military programs. Its aim is to obtain appropriations "in full" from the legislators for Washington's escalation of the arms race. In the long list of military programs a special place is assigned to the creation of new systems and the improvement of existing systems designed to ensure communication and control of all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces in whatever part of the globe they may be, it is stressed. In particular, it is a question of two-way communication with missile-carrying nuclear submarines on combat patrol, strategic bombers in flight, the interventionist Rapid Deployment Forces when they are shipped to the Near and Middle East or to other regions of the planet remote from the United States where, at Washington's will, "crisis situations" could arise at any time, and so forth.

A special section of the fact sheet is devoted to major American radar stations designed to give warning of a ballistic missile attack. As is known, under the Soviet-American ABM Treaty such stations should only be sited on the periphery of the sides' national territory. The Pentagon, it seems, finds the borders of its own country too cramped. In flagrant violation of the treaty, it is siting one such phased-array radar station at Thule (Greenland) and plans to build another at Fylingdales (Britain). The United States makes no secret of the fact that the stations are designed to fulfill certain ABM functions. The fact sheet says frankly that the purpose of these radar stations is to "seek, locate, and track any ICBM's launched from the territory of the Soviet Union or China."



Expatiations about allegedly possible launches of Soviet or Chinese missiles have an evil, provocative purpose. The authors of the fact sheet pretend never to have heard of the USSR's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons that was made at the Second General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament in 1982. Incidentally, the PRC made a similar pledge. So the clearly imaginary "fears" are voiced in Washington for no other purpose than to fan anti-Soviet hysteria, further whip up tension, and further complicate the arms limitation and reduction process. It is not without reason that THE NEW YORK TIMES admits that, in the present administration, policy in the arms sphere is pursued by figures who do not want agreement with the USSR, but an arms race.

In the illusory hope of emerging victorious from that race, they are stepping up the implementation of programs for the development [razrabotka] and creation [sozdaniye] of a series of sophisticated types of strategic weapons. Thus according to CBS television reports, at the Warren missile base in Wyoming work is under way to prepare for the siting of the first new MX ICBM. The installation over the work site of a special cover preventing Soviet national technical means from observing it gives grounds for asserting that the United States has embarked on the violation of SALT II provisions banning the construction of additional stationary ICBM launch installations and the masking of work in progress.

Washington is in a hurry to deploy the MX, which is being created as a first-strike weapon (each missile to have 10 warheads with a capacity of 600 kilotons each). As is known, Congress sanctioned the deployment of 50 such missiles. That is not enough for the White House. It is chivying the Pentagon to elaborate the "best method of siting an additional number of MX missiles" -- another 50.

It has been announced in Washington that design work on the creation [sozdaniye] of the new Trident-2 missile (D-5) is in full swing. The Pentagon strategists are gambling on it in their desire to secure military superiority for America. At present there are seven Ohio nuclear submarines armed with Trident-1 (C-4) missiles in service. The eighth boat started trials in May. The ninth, which it is planned to build by the end of this decade, and every subsequent boat of this type will be equipped with Trident-2 missiles. They will have considerably higher tactical and technical characteristics (range 11,000 km; accuracy 90 meters; a multiple reentry vehicle with 7 warheads each with a capacity of 600 kilotons or 14 warheads of 150 kilotons).

The publicity for U.S. strategic aviation has hitherto placed the emphasis on the creation by the early nineties of a bomber using "stealth" technology, which, according to Pentagon experts' plans, will not be detectable by present-day air defense systems. It has now become known that the President has also instructed the Pentagon to ensure the accelerated development of a long-range cruise missile using "stealth" technology. Special hopes are pinned on this missile in the sphere of overcoming "all the contemplated Soviet air defense systems," thanks to new technology and low flight altitudes. The plan is for this missile to enter the armory of a B-52 and B-1B bombers in the late eighties.

The picture of the arms race being whipped up by Washington would be far from complete without considering a number of other very alarming factors. For instance, without considering the administration's decision to commence production of binary chemical weapons intended for deployment and for waging wars on the European Continent. Nor can we ignore another very worrying report -- on the attempts being made to virtually erase the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. The relevant research is being carried out at the Livermore Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, which is "in a fever." According to the people there, it is a question of a so-called "add-on nuclear component," which any type of weapon could be adapted to take. The implementation of this plan would, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, create a "nightmarish situation for the arms control process."

The implementation of the "star wars" program continues, with the violation of a number of basic provisions of the ABM Treaty. It is characteristic that in Washington they are now trying to forget the former assurances that the "Strategic Defense Initiative" will make nuclear weapons obsolete. Rather the reverse is true. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle and other high-ranking officials are now speaking openly of SDI as an addition to the U.S. offensive strategic nuclear arsenal.

Research work and experiments under the SDI program are taking on an unprecedented scale. "There is every reason to suppose," (V.) Kistiakowsky, professor at Massachusetts University, noted with alarm, "that the so-called 'Strategic Defense Initiative' will trample underfoot all the research work being done at American universities."

One can increasingly hear in the United States the uncomplimentary epithets that sober-minded Americans confer on the administration's militarist course: "irresponsible," "playing poker for high stakes," "an open challenge to the Soviet Union." "I believe," P. Warnke, a leading U.S. specialist in disarmament, declares, "that this is an insane policy, and at this stage the insane have won."

Even in the conditions of the continuing whipping up of bellicose chauvinism in the country, there is an increasing awareness of the true causes of the sharp deterioration in the international situation. "The risk of the outbreak of nuclear war is increasing because of the Reagan administration's policy, Peter (Vobas), an inhabitant of Newark (Delaware), writes in the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER. There are fewer and fewer simpletons who blindly believe the anti-Soviet fables put about by propaganda. "It is obvious," THE NEW YORK TIMES notes, "that President Reagan does not care -- but other Americans should care -- about the fact that because of his policy the majority of the world regards not the Soviet Union, but the United States as the main obstacle in the path of nuclear disarmament."

Even in the government circles of NATO countries, which usually unreservedly approve Washington's policy, they are now unable to conceal their displeasure about his very dangerous actions. As West Germany's SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG stresses, behind the West Europeans' critical words about the United States "one can glimpse a suspicion of treachery -- treachery toward detente and arms control," that is, toward values which for Western Europe, "have the character literally of a fundamental law."

The open show of displeasure in the NATO countries at Washington's dangerous policy is very revealing. Nonetheless its significance should not be exaggerated. It is noteworthy that the criticisms of the senior Atlantic partner by officials are often described in the West as "rebellion on your knees." And here is why. As America's CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR puts it, the displeasure of ruling circles, for instance those of Britain and the FRG, with White House policy is based on its adoption of "unnecessary measures that could make life more difficult for the existing conservative governments." For them to be compromised by too close links with Washington's reckless course is regarded as particularly dangerous when parliamentary elections are approaching in the countries concerned.

Today, on the 45th anniversary of fascist Germany's perfidious attack on our motherland, alarming analogies cannot but spring to mind. Now as then, the most reactionary forces of imperialism are preaching frenzied anti-Sovietism. Now as then, seeking world domination, they are turning agreements into mere scraps of paper and arming themselves feverishly.

In these exceptionally complex conditions the main avenue of the activity of our party and the Soviet state in the international arena is the struggle against the nuclear danger and the arms race and for the preservation and strengthening of universal peace. "The Soviet Union," M.S. Gorbachev stated at the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum, "will continue persistently to pursue its initiatives, which accord with the cherished hopes of our people and all the planet's peoples. But we will never allow U.S. nuclear missile superiority. Here our Leninist foreign policy course and our defense might are based on the reliable foundations of the strategy of accelerating socioeconomic development elaborated by the party..." The new peace proposals set forth at the CPSU Central Committee plenum are in contrast to the imperial claims of the "hawks" across the ocean and are another weighty contribution to the peoples' struggle to prevent war.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: CHICAGO TRIBUNE SAYS REAGAN SEEKS NO DEAL

LD271822 Moscow TASS in English 1742 GMT 27 Jun 86

[Text] New York, 27 Jun (TASS)--"It looks more and more as though President Reagan never really hoped or intended to reach a major new nuclear weapons control agreement with the Soviet Union", the influential newspaper CHICAGO TRIBUNE writes in its editorial article,

Now time is running out on the Reagan presidency, it writes one can draw a conclusion that "this administration never had, and still does not have, any honest enthusiasm for striking a deal with the Soviets."

Reagan went into office stating that the SALT II Treaty concluded by his predecessor with the Russians is "fatally flawed", the article writes. He contended that the greatest and most expensive military build-up in U.S. history was needed to create a position of bargaining strength.

It appears clear now that Reagan's approach might have been less a strategy at the talks than a ploy designed to dodge them, the CHICAGO TRIBUNE writes. The "administration appears now to be less eager for an agreement than it was on inauguration day".

"The President and his Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, along with other powerful voices in the administration--insist there can be no compromise, no bargaining, on their sacrosanct 'star wars' strategic defense initiative".

"Further, instead of talking about new agreements, the President announces the U.S. is going to abandon the SALT II restrictions", the article says. "And Weinberger goes him one better and talks about the U.S. abrogating the ABM Treaty".

Meanwhile, the newspaper recalls, all the polls in the United States "make plain that nuclear arms control is an urgent concern among Americans".

"That being the case, Reagan's successor probably will be more interested in making a deal than Reagan has been. So the question now is what should be done by congress in the meantime to prepare for the time when the United States wants to negotiate again in earnest", the CHICAGO TRIBUNE concludes.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET COMMENTARIES STRESS LINK BETWEEN ARMS TALKS, SUMMIT

USA Institute Specialists

LD010912 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 29 Jun 86

["Top Priority" discussion program presented by Vladimir Posner with Profs Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada]

[Text] [Posner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Posner presenting "Top Priority" with Profs Radomir Bogdanov, and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute in Moscow. It's been a while since we've been together, gentlemen. I was in the United States for 35 days. How have you been since we last saw each other?

[Bogdanov] Fine, fine, but we are very eager to hear your stories about USA. You promised us to tell us something interesting, what you have come across, whom you met, so I hope you will keep your word, (please?).

[Posner] I will do that, absolutely. I simply wish to say that it was indeed a very interesting trip. I learned many things, I saw many things. And one of the questions that came up on many occasions, which seemed to concern many Americans both in higher positions and ordinary people was: Will there be a summit? I have to say that a great many Americans asked me that: Do you think that we will have a summit in 1986? And my answer is that I am cautiously, very cautiously, optimistic that we will have one, but I underline the word cautiousness. And I think that perhaps today, considering all the interest that does exist in the United States, and considering perhaps some of the signals that we have been seeing in the past few days, we might look at this whole summit issue and I would like you both to give your assessment as to whether it is realistic to believe that there will be a summit. What has been the approach on both sides? What is the situation?

[Bogdanov] How strange it is that the same kind of interest is here in this country too, not only in USA. If you meet people, if you talk to people here, they also discuss the same question: Will a summit take place or not?

[Posner] Well, that's natural, I mean...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] That's quite natural and I'm absolutely sure that if you go to any West European country or Scandinavian or Third World country, they will discuss the same question because it's the world, really world problem of world dimension. Now you put very interesting and very important question.

You put it very mildly, cautiously optimistic. Then you mentioned some recent developments and you would like us to express our opinion, what -- how we assess that, what does it mean? My view might be different from my friends, you Sergey or yours.

[Posner] I hope [words indistinct]

[Bogdanov] I'm really more on the pessimistic side than on even cautiously optimistic side, you know. And mine is very simple, mine is very simple, you know. First of all, I would like to remind our American listeners that summitry, it's something very, very, very -- it used to be very normal, very usual in the Soviet-American relations over the past 10 years. And I'm sorry to say that the very useful practice was ruined, literally speaking, was ruined by this administration. They put it like that: Until we feel strong enough to talk with them, no summit, no summit.

So let's presume that at a given moment they felt strong enough to meet our leader and to talk to him. I mean ...

[Posner, interrupting] In Geneva?

[Bogdanov] In Geneva, yes. I leave it to (?them). Strong, weak: all that it is (? not, not) -- I'm not playing these games, you know. But at the same time, you know, if you are a responsible politician -- let's forget about those definitions -- strong, weak and things like that, let's talk about business, what is really important. When two leaders meet, they discuss most important problems of major concern for everybody. They have already discussed many problems in Geneva and they found some common ground. Now, my question to you, Vladimir, and to my colleague, Sergey: What happened after Geneva? Why, after Geneva, when it was fixed in the communique, that the next meeting is going to take place this year and the second the next year, what happened? Why they are talking about? Why we say we are cautiously optimistic or we are not optimistic, let's first start talking about what happened in between, in the meantime.

[Posner] After Geneva.

[Bogdanov] After Geneva.

[Posner] All right, all right.

[Bogdanov] Why this question, why this question?

[Posner] All right, all right, let's talk about it. All right, Professor Plekhanov, would you care to pick up on that one?

[Plekhanov] I think there've been a number of very negative developments in the U.S. foreign policy. We have seen a major blow delivered to the structures of the arms control. SALT II has been virtually repudiated by the Reagan administration and the ABM Treaty is in great danger.

[Posner] Now wait a minute. When you say a blow dealt to arms control, do you mean that SALT II and the ABM or something else?

[Plekhanov] Yes, these two particular.

[Posner] Because I say that because the SALT II decision came just recently, I think, just recently.

[Plekhanov] Yes, well, yes but the movement in that direction has been visible virtually since the beginning of the year. There have been deliberations in the administration and there were...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Since after the Geneva meeting, I'm sorry to say that,

[Plekhanov] In Geneva both leaders committed themselves to acceleration of talks on limiting, or, reducing offensive missiles and preventing an arms race in space. Ever since Geneva, we've seen no progress on arms race in space; in fact, the other day, Paul Nitze made it clear that the United States does not mean to discuss any limits on SDI because this is not what they have in mind when they talk about arms race in space. They have in mind something else which is an interesting observation, but it underlines the fact that the Reagan administration has not really been willing to go in the direction that it indicated it would when Mr. Reagan signed that communique, that joint statement in Geneva.

[Posner] You have been talking about what Dr Bogdanov says makes him pessimistic in whether or not there may indeed be a summit this year. You have been enumerating the issues, as I understand it, that make you pessimistic, and you're saying concretely, number one: In the area of arms limitation the United States has demonstrated no desire to follow the decisions that were taken and the spirit that emerged from Geneva.

[Plekhanov] Yes, and even more, an increased desire to move in the opposite direction, toward dismantling arms control.

[Posner] And in foreign relations you're pointing to Libya as an example of the kind of policy that signals no desire to reach any kind of agreement. Am I understanding you correctly?

[Bogdanov] Yes. Yes you are right, but...

[Posner, interrupting] Would you, I would like you to also touch on concrete other points, like [words indistinct].

[Bogdanov] You know there is another point of mine which, which to my mind is very important for the clarification of the whole business you know -- moratorium.

[Posner] Yes.

[Bogdanov] We have, you know, proclaimed moratorium unilaterally. We stopped testing for 1 year now.

[Posner] It'll be a year on 6 August.

[Bogdanov] Yes, on 6 August, and we were giving a chance to the American side to reciprocate -- number one. Number two, to create a benign climate for Soviet summit meeting. Instead of that, since we stopped, they not only stopped but they are testing almost every month [as heard]. On the 25th they will test their 13th.

[Posner] They tested it.



[Bogdanov] They tested already 13th device. Now if they are so eager to meet our leader my question to them is how it is possible that you are demonstrating to us, signalling to us, that we are going this way, we deny whatever you suggest, whatever you do, we deny, but at the same time come over to us, come over to us. So I would put it like that. If you're really interested in creating a proper environment for a meeting the first thing, and very cheap one, I mean very easy one is just to follow the [word indistinct] and stop testing. That would be proper signal for us that the other side is really seriously thinking of doing business with the Soviet leader, that's my point.

[Posner] Dr Plekhanov, yes?

[Plekhanov] I'd like to put it this way, I think the Reagan administration wants to have its cake and eat it; at the same time it wants to do all those bad things in Soviet-American relations and foreign policy, all those destructive things that it has been doing and at the same time to be able to shake hands, to make the, create the image that everything is going fine in Soviet-American relations.

[Posner] Dr Plekhanov, let me interrupt you there for one minute and ask you this.

What are the signals, what are the gestures that would indicate to an objective onlooker that the Soviet Union does indeed want a summit and is carrying out the decisions of Geneva and fulfilling the spirit of Geneva? In other words, can we argue that while the United States seem to be doing the opposite, the Soviet Union indeed is doing what it said it would do, can we argue that and if so what are the facts?

[Plekhanov] Well, since the middle of January the Soviet Government has been putting forward proposal after proposal specifying its position on arms control and disarmament. We have come up with a radical proposal...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] In a very compromise spirit by the way.

[Posner] That's a very important point and we'll come back to that in a minute, yes.

[Plekhanov] Yes, that's what I was going to say, that on 15 January Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a program for total disarmament by the year 2000. At the same time we have been putting forward other proposals which would lead toward that goal, but which would be practicable in the nearest future, in fact right now.

[Posner] Could you, could you touch on some of those proposals?

[Plekhanov] Well, elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, while leaving the French and British missiles in tact.

[Posner] Troop reductions?

[Plekhanov] Troop reductions in Europe, which is another major issue, because one of the criticisms aimed at our disarmament, nuclear disarmament program, was, yes, but what about the conventional weapons? Well we are now prepared for radical cuts in our conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe, in fact we're proposing that both sides cut their troop numbers by half a million, so all in all there would be a million soldiers less in Europe. At the same time we proposed talks on confidence building measures and changes in the military doctrine -- some arrangements which would make it far less likely that a military conflict might occur in Europe. So we, we



put on the table a very far-reaching and concrete program of conventional disarmament, if you will, in Europe. At the same time on the strategic arms front we recently came up with a proposal which sort of divides into several portions -- our position on reducing the strategic missiles and preventing arms race in space. What we're offering now is that the ABM Treaty be, that both sides confirm that they would adhere to the ABM Treaty at least for 15 years, at the same time that they would be able to conduct research on strategic defense. As far as the offensive weapons are concerned, which we are talking about is...

[Posner, interrupting] Antisatellite?

[Plekhanov] Yes, we're dividing the antisatellite -- the space-strike category of space-strike weapons has now been specified...

[Posner, interrupting] Into three categories.

[Plekhanov] Three categories, right. The antisatellite weapons, weapons which can be used from space against targets on earth and the antiballistic system. What we're offering now is that the sides, both sides should distinguish between those most dangerous systems and those which may (?cause) less concern. So it is an offer which we hope will be picked up by the other side, and seriously studied by...

[Posner, interrupting] Dr Bogdanov, I want to go back to a very important (?word you used). We have made a lot of offers in the spirit of compromise. Now there must be some people in the U.S. establishment, especially among the hardliners, who are saying it is because we, the United States, have adopted such a tough stance that the Soviets have been forced to bargain and to compromise. In other words they are in a position of weakness, we the United States are in a position of power and we should keep on doing it because we will make them gradually go all the way down to whatever we find necessary. Now what do you think about that kind of argument?

[Bogdanov] You know it's very old song, it's a business in a very best sense of that word -- it's a business like approach to such a serious matter. If you have some bucks more in your pocket then you can intimidate your partner to such an extent that he will yield to your pressure.

[Posner] Is it true?

[Bogdanov] You know it is, that there is not a bit of truth in that, because they deal with a great big power with a very great history which is not to be dealt with in that way. There is another point which I would like to call our listeners' attention to. Responsibility of behavior which has been taken for the weakness, for the weakness. Responsibility of behavior in the nuclear era, when your, you know your frame of mind, your thinking must be absolutely different. And to be frank with you, Vladimir, I don't know how to convince our American listeners that it is not a weakness, it's a goodwill. After all, I don't care too much how they take it, for a weakness or for a strength. I care only about one thing, if they believe over there that by a kind of a pressure, exhaustion of the Soviet Union they can get something, that's the greatest mistake in the history, they have made a number of mistakes like that. Unfortunately, this administration has no historical memory, I'm sorry to say that, but if they ask their own seniors sitting in the research centers, academies and things like that they may get very interesting statements on the history of our relations from that, what America could get from USSR from the position of strength? None. Nothing. But after all, you know, it's not so important now. What is important is let's do business, that's what is important.

[Posner] Well there have been noises over the past few days from Washington, including the President of the United States, saying things that sound much nicer. They seem to accept that indeed the Soviet Union is seriously interested in arms limitation and arms control, so I repeat I remain cautiously optimistic about a summit meeting this year. You gentlemen are cautiously pessimistic, I certainly hope I'm right and not you, and on that hopeful note I would like to end this edition of "Top Priority" with Dr Bogdanov and Dr Plekhanov and your host Vladimir Posner. Dr Bogdanov, you want to say something I see, please go ahead and say it.

[Bogdanov] Oh I wish you were right Vladimir, really, that's what, how I would like to end our "Top Priority."

[Plekhanov] So do I.

[Posner] That's a good way to end it, until next time, same day, and of course same time.

#### APN Chief Falin

BW030715 Hamburg ARD Television in German 2005 GMT 2 Jul 86

[Interview with APN Director Valentin Falin by correspondent Lutz Lehmann in Moscow; on the "Brennpunkt" program; no date given -- recorded]

[Lehmann] We in the West, Mr Falin, have gained the impression of a political offensive launched by the Soviet Union. Why does the Soviet Union submit its proposals now, and why in that quantity?

[Falin] Mr Lehmann, I do not want to use the term offensive. Time is pressing, we are not. If we fail to handle problems and dangers today it might become more difficult, if not impossible, to do so tomorrow. If we deploy weapons in space -- and we are not talking about just any kind of weapons but of very dangerous ones -- the question of war or peace has no alternative. The question is only when war will come. Today it depends on people, on whether or not we will be successful. Tomorrow it will depend in particular on technology.

[Lehmann] Do you mean the U.S. leadership? Another question, how do you assess the reactions from the White House so far?

[Falin] The reactions are very depressing. They range from totally negative reactions -- for instance SALT II and the withdrawal of the United States from this complex, from this process -- to well-balanced negative reactions. The United States promises to examine the recent Soviet proposals before September and to formulate a position afterwards. However, it is important to ask what the United States will do in the meantime. As far as the past few days and weeks are concerned, it did nothing really encouraging.

[Lehmann] What would be, in your opinion, a good schedule for further disarmament negotiations? What are the priorities, what should be the first step?

[Falin] In my view, it is necessary to compare the principles first. If the two sides do not agree on certain principles -- and I am talking in particular about the principle of equality and equal security -- negotiations on details are more or less a waste of time. Both sides must understand what they are negotiating, what they want to achieve, and whether or not their goals are compatible.

[Lehmann] What is the most important point for the Soviet Union?

[Falin] The most important thing is that we do not need military superiority, we do not strive for it and we would like to assume that the other side does not either. We do not want declarations, they are only words. We do need the certainty that the United States and the West are serious, that balance, equality, and today's stability are more or less guaranteed and not violated. We would like to reduce the level of military confrontation, because a new missile -- only one new missile, no matter whether it is in the West or in the East -- does not increase security but reduces security on both sides. One must see that clearly.

[Lehmann] Mr Falin, that does not sound very optimistic. Nevertheless, since yesterday, since the Soviet Union is trying again to achieve a meeting of the foreign ministers -- obviously in preparation of the summit -- since yesterday one might believe that such a summit is possible again, even this year. Do you agree?

[Falin] That does not depend on what the Soviet Union wants or does not want. We are ready to come together tomorrow, if we know what the two sides will talk about, what they will decide, whether this meeting will be the continuation of the endeavour of last November, or whether they will make a fresh start to discuss the most important problems -- and whether then everything will end in a new declaration. We do not need words, we need deeds. We are ready for those deeds.

[Lehmann] In other words, if your foreign minister will meet with Secretary of State Shultz, they would have to talk concretely about the contents and the results of the summit?

[Falin] Certainly. That is our main point. I repeat, we are ready to come together tomorrow or the day after or in a week, no matter where.

[Lehmann] And it really does not matter what is negotiated first -- the reduction of conventional armament or intermediate-range missiles in Europe?

[Falin] I would say we must be sure that the two big powers begin with the most important problems, and resolve at least one part of these important issues or come close to a solution.

#### Broadcast to North America

LD060039 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 5 Jul 86

[Valentin Zorin commentary]

[Text] At the Moscow Press Center, American newsmen have asked me what Moscow thinks of President Reagan's favorable statement about the Soviet Union's latest proposals to reduce nuclear weapons and his mention of an American-Soviet summit. I must admit that

this is a hard question to answer. We are pleased of course that the President has finally considered it possible not to reject Soviet proposals out of hand as has always happened before, but to appraise them realistically. This gives rise to some hope. However, in the same statement, Mr Reagan said something that must put us on our guard. Referring to the latest round of talks in Geneva he claimed that the Soviet representatives had shown no interest in a substantial discussion of matters relating to nuclear disarmament. This assertion is more than strange, and to some extent detracts from the constructive tone of what the President said.

The truth is quite the opposite. Washington is well aware of the series of constructive and highly important proposals the Soviet Union has made not only in the past two weeks, but in the months that have elapsed since the Geneva summit. I refer to the Soviet program for the abolition of nuclear weapons in stages over the next 15 years, the Soviet Union's agreement to all types of control including on-site inspection, also our unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and our proposal for a mutual reduction of conventional weapons in a framework of like security.

So far the United States response to all this has been a major series of nuclear tests, accelerated work under the star wars program and a refusal to observe the anti-missile defense treaty. Essentially President Reagan's approving comment on the latest Soviet proposals is Washington's only constructive gesture and this is only verbal. In practical matters Washington has not moved an inch from its old positions. It has not shown any initiative. It has not made any new constructive proposals. Even this positive verbal gesture was largely forced upon it because in Geneva the Soviet delegates in the group on space and the group on strategic weapons and the group on medium-range nuclear weapons have put forward proposals that are detailed, balanced and consider the interests of both sides. These proposals have received support around the world and are seen as constructive in countries allied to the United States.

Nor can the Soviet Union ignore that fact that contradictory sounds have been coming out of Washington. While President Reagan makes constructive statements his defense secretary and certain other high-ranking administration officials say quite the opposite. How is this to be understood? What conclusions must Moscow draw from these contradictory signals? The Soviet Union believes that if Soviet-American relations are to reflect the Geneva spirit and there's to be another summit, serious work is needed to decide on specific practical measures that the two sides would take to slow down the arms race. Just this past week the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said the Soviet Union would only welcome it if Washington began to take a more serious and responsible attitude towards the problem of disarmament. It hoped the American administration would associate itself with the Soviet initiatives and make it possible to hold a summit and hammer out the agreements that the nations hope for.

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CSO: 5200/1459

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### KARPOV SAYS NO 'PRACTICAL ACCORDS' REACHED IN GENEVA

LD091302 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1145 GMT 9 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow, 9 Jul (TASS) -- The fifth round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva ended without any practical accords whatsoever, said Viktor Karpov, leader of the Soviet delegation and head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department on Arms Limitations and Disarmament Problems, in an interview given to a NOVOYE VREMYA magazine correspondent. The interview is published in the 28th issue of the weekly.

It is true that the U.S. side, as the U.S. President also declared, expressed a readiness to study the Soviet proposals and reply to them. The question is only what this reply will be. One hopes that it will be positive and that the following round will yield specific results. The deciding word is up to the U.S. side. The USSR's position at the talks creates real opportunities to reach accord on the whole range of problems of space and nuclear arms this year, emphasized V. Karpov.

We are engaged in a constructive search for mutually acceptable practical solutions and we do not seek unilateral advantages of military superiority for ourselves. We are ready to make both the most radical of decisions and intermediate decisions. Moreover, we do not set an ultimatum. On the contrary, we take into account the other side's position.

However, I am not inclined to fall into euphoria, noted the head of the Soviet delegation. A sober appraisal both of the state of affairs at the talks and of the actions undertaken by the United States outside the framework of the talks is needed. After all, Washington has officially announced its refusal to continue to observe the accords enshrined in the SALT I and the SALT II agreements. If the United States proceeds along the path of developing more and more new types of strategic arms -- as is envisaged by their programs -- such a development of events will certainly not facilitate success in the talks.

It is known that in essence the U.S. SDI program runs counter to the ABM Treaty. And it is not a coincidence, for instance, that U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger has repeatedly stated that at some stage of its implementation the United States will come to face the necessity of either reviewing the treaty or simply abandoning it altogether.

The U.S. side has repeatedly stated that it is ready to hold a Soviet-American summit. But if the United States is really interested in a meeting of this kind, then it should, by concrete deeds, confirm its proclaimed readiness to reach concrete and practical solutions in the field of disarmament, said Viktor Karpov.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

PRAVDA REVIEWS FIFTH ROUND OF GENEVA ARMS TALKS

PM031815 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jul 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent B. Dubrovin dispatch: "For a Constructive Approach"]

[Text] Geneva, July [as published] -- The fifth round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments has ended here. The talks were marked by new constructive proposals by the USSR relating, what is more, to all three avenues of negotiation. Realizing that the talks had taken the course of fruitless discussions because of the stance taken by Washington, which is reluctant to embark on a full prohibition of space-strike arms and that the U.S. programs for the arms race in space are beginning to acquire increasingly real contours, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States that an agreement be reached on partial measures that could be adopted right now. Each agreement would make a weighty contribution to the solution of the task of averting the militarization of space.

There are three such steps: the strengthening of conditions surrounding the ABM Treaty, including pledges by the sides not to depart from this treaty for a period of 15 years and with the strict observance of the restrictions that the treaty stipulates, the prohibition of antisatellite systems, and the prohibition of "space-to-earth" armaments.

In the group on strategic arms, our country proposed an interim solution: reaching an agreement on the establishment of equal ceilings for both sides for the number of strategic delivery vehicles -- 1,600 units each -- and equal levels for the nuclear charges on these delivery vehicles -- 8,000 units for each of the sides. Given such an approach it would be possible, for a time, to leave for separate solution the question of U.S. medium-range nuclear means, which, by dint of their emplacement close to Soviet borders, can reach USSR territory, and the question of long-range ground-launched cruise missiles. However, in order to prevent the undermining of a future agreement, the United States would have to pledge not to build up this kind of armament and, in particular, not to station them in places where they are not already stationed. And, of course, to implement the interim agreement on strategic offensive arms, it is absolutely essential that an accord be drawn up on strengthening the conditions surrounding the ABM Treaty.

As for the medium-range nuclear means, at the very start of the last round of talks, the Soviet side submitted a draft agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. missiles in Europe -- a carefully balanced document embodying in legal formulations a possible accord on this issue that has long been ripe for settling. The question of the observance of accords concluded earlier in the field of limiting strategic offensive arms assumed particular acuteness during the round of negotiations that has now ended.

Despite all the efforts by the Soviet side, there was no businesslike discussion of these issues. Continuing as before to avoid their specific examination, the United States essentially engaged either in general arguments about "Soviet military advantages" that allegedly already exist or which potentially exist, or in "refuting" arbitrarily selected individual provisions of the USSR's position. Moreover, all this was served up with the old sauce of the illusory "benefits" of a joint transition to the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of "strategic defense" systems with space-based elements which are prohibited under the ABM Treaty. As a result, it is becoming increasingly obvious that Washington's chief aim in questions of space is to preserve the "star wars" program at any cost, and not at all to make progress at the talks.

Now to turn to the reduction of strategic arms. The U.S. proposals submitted 1 November last year directly concerning strategic offensive arms have, even in themselves, no basis for the adoption of a mutually acceptable solution.

They are aimed at ensuring one-sided military advantages for the United States and are in fact proposals not for the reduction of nuclear arsenals but for their buildup, and, moreover, in directions that are considered advantageous in Washington. Nevertheless, they continue there to adhere doggedly to this wittingly dead-end stance, hypocritically declaring that the USSR has allegedly not given a suitable response to these proposals.

As for the medium-range nuclear means, the United States is continuing, despite joint accords, including those at the highest level, to avoid the practical discussion of the problems of this kind of weapons in Europe.

Questions of monitoring [kontrol] assumed special acuteness at the past round of talks. The Soviet Union attaches special significance to this because without monitoring [kontrol] which ensures confidence that an adopted pledge is being strictly fulfilled, the limitation and reduction of arms, and all the more so, disarmament, are impossible. It is indicative that in light of the statements, including those made at the highest level, about the Soviet Union's willingness for all the necessary verification [kontrol] measures -- ranging from the use of national technical means, to on-site inspection [inspektsii na meste] -- Washington changed its tune. They no longer say that the Soviet Union does not want reliable monitoring [kontrol] of compliance with agreed limitations. A different move had been made: The verification [kontrol] process is being set in opposition to the actual process of disarmament. They are arguing and disputing over what could be monitored [kontrolirovat] and how, while forgetting about the need first and foremost to draw up specific measures for limiting arms.

Summing up the results of the round of negotiations that have now ended, it can be said that the main result of these talks is that the Soviet Union has submitted important fundamental proposals to which the United States has not given an answer. The very logic of negotiations and the objective need to solve the task of preventing the emergence of weapons in space are organically interconnected with the reduction of nuclear arms and directly pose the question of the necessity for a revision of the present U.S. approach to the talks and the bringing of the U.S. avowed desire for peace into line with the practical deeds.



31 July 1986

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

## USSR'S PETROVSKIY GIVES PRESS CONFERENCE IN GENEVA

LD251732 Moscow TASS in English 1703 GMT 25 Jun 86

[Text] Geneva June 25 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vladislav Shishlo reports:

Today not a single state has any other way for surviving but attainment of political solutions and working out of agreements on limiting and reducing arsenals of destruction, said Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister.

Speaking at a press conference here, he pointed out that nobody could defend itself single-handed with military technical means, with defence on land and in space.

The Soviet representative singled out the problem of banning nuclear tests as the top priority task. Its solution is blocked only by the USA which needs nuclear explosions to develop new types and systems of nuclear and space weapons.

In his statement at the press conference he pointed to the importance of the new Soviet proposals aimed at accelerating the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on limiting nuclear and space weapons. The Soviet representative also emphasized the all-embracing nature of the recent proposals by the Warsaw Treaty countries on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe whose implementation would make it possible to cut numerical strength of troops on the continent by over one million by the beginning of the 1990's. This initiative of the socialist countries is of significance both as an independent move to lessen the military danger on the continent and as a substantial buttress to efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

It was pointed out that a discrepancy had developed between the state of affairs at the negotiations on disarmament and the buildup in armaments under the present complicated international conditions, the responsibility for which is borne by the USA and its close allies, which did not wish to bring down the level of military preparations. The amelioration of such a situation needs efforts of all peaceful states and active participation of all and everyone. In our nuclear-space age there are no and cannot be bystanders in disarmament and in ensuring universal security, noted the Soviet representative.

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## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### SOVIET UN REPRESENTATIVE OUTLINES LATEST PROPOSALS

LD182234 Moscow TASS in English 2201 GMT 18 Jun 86

[Text] New York, 19 Jun (TASS)--TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reporting:

The new Soviet initiatives aim for improving the international situation and facilitating the search for mutually acceptable agreements at the Geneva Talks, said Vladimir Safronchuk, acting permanent representative of the USSR to the United Nations. He spoke at a press conference at the United Nations headquarters held in view of the immense interest of the international community to the report given by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the June plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Soviet representative emphasized that for that purpose the Soviet Union proposed an intermediate variant to the United States. In keeping with it an agreement is to be reached on staying within the limits of the ABM treaty for at least 15 years, and for limiting operations in the SDI field to the level of laboratory research, that is, the threshold which the United States had actually approached already. Equal limits are to be set on the strategic offensive armaments.

The question of medium-range weapons reaching the territory of the other side, including long-range ground-based cruise missiles, is to be solved separately in this case.

Thus, the Soviet representative said, the Soviet Union is demonstrating the desire to reach a mutually acceptable agreement at the Geneva talks.

The Soviet representative calls the attention of those present to a series of major peace initiatives of the USSR--a concrete plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the current century. The unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions instituted last 6 August and extended till 6 August 1986, despite the continuing nuclear weapons tests in the United States, and the proposal on the elimination of chemical weapons.

The Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states worked out a joint wide-scale proposal on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in the whole of Europe--from the Atlantic to the Urals, the Soviet representative went on to say.

However, a whole series of refusals follows from Washington in response to all these initiatives, it was stated at the press conference.

Its reluctance to negotiate in good faith in Geneva and Vienna is manifest. In Berne, Washington thwarted the effort to achieve important agreements on human rights. This can be explained only by the total failure of U.S. leaders to accept the existing realities, the Soviet representative said.

However, the USSR will follow the course charted by the 27th CPSU Congress--the course toward accelerating social and economic development of the country, toward wide-scale international cooperation from which all stands to gain, toward disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. This course receives a broad backing from nations and governments of many countries, including in Western Europe, which come out in favor of the USSR and the United States reaching agreements.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MOSCOW HIGHLIGHTS ARMS CONTENT OF GORBACHEV'S POLAND SPEECHES

LDO21758 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Jul 86

[Commentary by station political observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] There is continuing comment abroad on the speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the 10th PZPR Congress and on what he had to say at the meeting with Warsaw workers and in the course of his friendly meetings with Wojciech Jaruzelski.

The Polish TRYBUNA LUDU stressed the tremendous political and international significance of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speeches. For its part, THE WASHINGTON POST notes that Moscow is convinced that progress in the sphere of disarmament cannot be expected until the United States gives a positive response to the latest Soviet proposals in the field of arms control. The London FINANCIAL TIMES notes the USSR's striving to continue the process of normalizing relations with the United States.

Aleksandr Zholkver, our political observer, is at the microphone:

The reports you have just heard show that the speeches that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made in Warsaw went far beyond the framework of Soviet-Polish relations in their significance. As state and public figures in many countries are noting, they truly concerned problems that affect the whole of mankind.

One of the most decisive and crucial stages is arriving in European politics and indeed in worldwide politics. There is a realistic opportunity to halt the build-up of military arsenals and radically turn the course of events toward peace, security, and international cooperation. Favorable conditions for this have been created by the peaceful initiatives of the USSR and other socialist states. In this connection one West German newspaper has remarked that the socialist countries have been literally bombarding the West with their peaceful proposals.

Indeed, in a period of less than 6 months, the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states have put forward a comprehensive and constructive program for all-embracing security, the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, and a radical reduction in conventional armaments. As is well-known, our stand on the issue has not been limited to just good wishes. For already the third time now the USSR has unilaterally extended the moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

But how has the United States responded to all this up to now? It has certainly not responded with peaceful bombardments. I am thinking not only of the U.S. air raids on Libya, but also the nuclear explosions in Nevada and the combat trials of space weapons, which the head of the Pentagon gave information on yesterday. I would also add to this the outbursts that U.S. diplomacy has been making against the SALT and ABM treaties.

Against the background of all these explosions and outbursts the bombastic statements by U.S. leaders about their striving for peace and disarmament, you will agree, do not appear all that convincing.

Nevertheless, considering President Reagan's recent statement to the effect that a turning point could come about in the efforts directed at strengthening security and peace throughout the whole world, one could only welcome it if Washington begins to be more serious and responsible in its attitude toward the problems of disarmament; but naturally negotiations alone are insufficient.

The USSR has sent the United States specific proposals on how at last to begin digging away the mountains of weapons. The broad response to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speeches in Warsaw is graphic confirmation that the people of the the world are awaiting this with hope.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S KVITSINSKIY PESSIMISTIC ON U.S. ARMS

DW030751 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG Supplement in German 2 Jul 86 p 1

[Interview with USSR Ambassador to the FRG Yuliy Kvitsinskiy by editor Udo Bergdoll; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] SZ: Mr Ambassador, you said that international relations have an influence on German-Soviet relations. Could you give an assessment of the present state of the Soviet-U.S. arms control negotiations in Geneva, and in particular, of the charge made by Washington that the USSR delegation so far has not introduced the disarmament proposals submitted by General Secretary Gorbachev into the negotiations and has not defined them concretely?

Kvitsinskiy: I was in Geneva for 4 years as chief negotiator, first on intermediate-range weapons and then on space weapons. I do not share the view that our delegations have not introduced the disarmament proposals submitted by General Secretary Gorbachev into the negotiations. I think I may say that is much rather a propagandistic-tactical trick by the Western media in an attempt to cover up the fact that in reality the U.S. side has always failed to present realistic proposals in Geneva. For example, I know of no proposal or draft agreement by the United States, which could or would allow us to resolve the problem of the arms race in space.

Such proposals just do not exist, even though in January 1985 and then during the summit meeting it was expressly agreed that the problem would be resolved during the negotiations. So there are political statements by the U.S. side, but no proposals and no contributions to the subject matter of the negotiations.

As you know, we have proposals on how to resolve the problem as a whole or -- if the Western side is not ready to resolve the problem as such -- step by step. We have submitted those proposals and they constitute a concrete translation of Mikhail Gorbachev's political initiatives into the language of the negotiations. The point is that the U.S. side does not want to prevent the arms race in space. It is trying to give a new interpretation to the respective accords, saying that an arms race in space can be prevented if both sides do the same thing simultaneously. But that is not a disarmament strategy, is it? It is a strategy of intensified armament. Because it is a strategy of intensified armament, we cannot accept it. Let us take another problem, the problem of the open laboratory, for example, the well-known U.S. initiative to open all space laboratories, which would allow effective verification and would help resolve the problem of avoiding the race in space. We have agreed to that. We have said,

okay, all laboratories, including the West German laboratories that fall under the SDI agreement for the purpose of the ban on offensive weapons in space. At that point, they suddenly said that they had not meant it that way. What was meant was the possibility of opening one laboratory on either side as a confidence-building measure and then continuing armament. I could go on like that. Do you remember that we were all told that the problem of nuclear test bans was depending on effective verification? We agreed to on-site inspections, with the result that we were told: Sorry, it was not meant that way. We cannot stop testing our nuclear weapons because we need nuclear weapons. Regrettably, the Americans act according to the motto: First you bluff, and hope you are not caught empty-handed.

SZ: Some observers of the Geneva negotiations consider a separate agreement on intermediate-range weapons in Europe possible. Do you share that view?

Kvitsinskiy: I always share my government's view, and the view is and remains that an agreement on intermediate-range weapons -- more precisely intermediate-range missiles -- in Europe is important per se, and that such an agreement can be concluded without linking it to space and strategic weapons, because it is an urgent concern, and because you have to begin somewhere to get the cow off the ice. We also acted accordingly. We put a corresponding draft agreement on the table in Geneva on 15 May. We are ready to negotiate on that agreement. It has been drawn up in detail, and if the agreement were to materialize, roughly 700 means of delivery and over 1,000 warheads -- the most modern means of delivery and warheads -- would be reduced. That is a unique chance for Europe and the world. If that chance is missed, it will be another example of the policy of lost opportunities.

SZ: Could the U.S. announcement to discontinue, under certain circumstances, adherence to the SALT II agreement of 1979 that was not ratified but has been observed by the two signatories, lead to jeopardizing the arms control negotiations in general?

Kvitsinskiy: The announcement that they will throw SALT II overboard does not come out of the blue. We warned about it long ago. Ever since this administration has been in office, the United States has managed, in 5 years, to conclude not one nuclear arms reduction agreement, not even a tiny agreement. However, it has consistently launched a campaign to mislead the international public by saying that the Soviet Union constantly violates existing agreements. Not a word is said about that. However, they have prepared themselves and others psychologically for the moment when the treaty hinders the U.S. nuclear programs so that at that point they can withdraw from the obligations of the treaty.

It seems to me that Washington believes that this moment has now come. They are about to test the second ICBM Minuteman. That would constitute a violation of the treaty. They also are about to commission new Trident submarines, and that will inevitably face them with the alternative of either scrapping or dismantling submarines of the older generation or transgress agreed limits. They will be faced with a similar alternative regarding the Air Force and strategic bombers. In that respect they have already said that they do not intend to adhere to the limits. As soon as they cease to adhere to the limits, the Soviet Union will feel it is freed from the obligations it has strictly observed until now. Naturally, such development will not have a positive influence on arms control negotiations, as you say. We have to realize that dropping the ultimate limits inevitably leads to an intensified arms race. It is much more difficult to reach agreement under circumstances where everyone intensifies armament as he likes.

SZ: Would that also entail consequences for Soviet-U.S. relations in general particularly for the planned second summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan?

Kvitsinskiy: Naturally, of course. That is an entirely opposite direction. They are in agreement that they want a summit meeting, not because of the summit meeting as such, but because they want to agree on something that is apt to strengthen peace and promote the relations and confidence between the two states. Such a way of acting that involves throwing the ultimate restrictions of the arms race overboard, naturally is not conducive to holding a summit meeting.

SZ: Mr Ambassador, in your view why are the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces in Europe stagnating? What role does the so-called "data issue" and the "geographical asymmetry" play, do you think?

Kvitsinskiy: That is a problem that requires a lengthy explanation. I took part in the opening of those negotiations in 1973. I also could console myself with the fact that the only document that has been agreed upon during the Vienna negotiations came about at that time. It is the document that defined the central European zone as well as the direct participants and the participants with special status. Simplifying matters, I would characterize the situation in Vienna as follows: Regrettably, the negotiations that are called negotiations on force reductions have been turned into negotiations on the so-called data problem. Just look at the present situation. Negotiations in Vienna had begun with the intention of considerably reducing troops and equipment of both sides. They there was some resistance by the West, including the Federal Republic. Later on, the U.S. and Soviet troops were separated from the total number of forces in that area. From that resulted two stages of reduction: At the initial stage, the Soviet and U.S. units were to be reduced. At the second stage, the one that concerns all the others and will start God knows when, something else would have to be done. Until now, we do not know what. That pattern then developed into a reduction that involves a few thousand U.S. troops and over 10,000 Soviet troops. The whole thing amounts to a reduction of no more than 0.1 percent. Because of that ridiculous reduction the West has now tried to enforce 30 on-site inspections every year, up to an including the number of battalions. A disproportion is evident.

They are negotiations on on-site inspections with nonreductions rather than on reductions involving inspections which serve reductions. That is not a normal state of affairs. I am not saying that the Vienna negotiations should be discontinued. We should be discontinued. We should continue to try and find solutions, because the reduction of troops in central Europe is very important. I want to stress that force reductions in central Europe are very important. I want to stress that the proposals that have been addressed to the NATO states in the form of an appeal by all Warsaw Pact member-states could show a way out of the situation and could constitute an impetus for resolving the entire problem of conventional reductions.

A new approach is necessary because we have returned to the question of a real physical reduction of large numbers of forces. In the first 1 or 2 years it will be 100,000 or 150,000 troops on both sides -- if everything works well -- with half a million being reduced on each side. Those are quite remarkable figures that will bring about a change in the military and political situation. It constitutes a change that does not affect the stability of the situation. It is a new approach to the matter to involve nuclear weapons in the reduction, weapons belonging to the equipment of the respective military units. These weapons will then be destroyed. These are tactical weapons, something



that has been always considered as very important in the FRG. I want to stress that it will not be merely a matter of reducing troops in Europe. The participants in such a meeting should agree that their troops will not be reinforced outside the reduction zone, that the withdrawn units will be demobilized, and that their equipment will be either destroyed or withdrawn to the national territory. There are also new proposals on the spot verifications and inspections, wherever that seems necessary.

So there is a possibility to ban space weapons. There is a possibility to curtail strategic weapons to a great extent. There is a possibility of banning intermediate-range weapons from Europe and scrap them, not only in Europe but also in half of Siberia. There is a real possibility to gain understanding on a complete ban of chemical weapons. Now all this is being complemented by a comprehensive offer in the field of conventional weapons. It demonstrates that the program outlined by Mr Gorbachev on 15 January is vital and dynamic, that we continue to pursue, complete, and develop the program with a view to the development of the situation and the requests of our partners in order to move toward the goal. The goal should be a safe world without any kind of mass destruction weapons and with a decisive reduction of conventional armed forces. That is the military-strategic demand of our epoch. It is the dictate of our time so that the available means can be used for the solution of tasks that face all mankind: utilization of space, environmental protection, combatting famine and need in developing countries, utilization of the oceans of the world, and so on. On the basis of reality, so to speak, the concentration of all material and spiritual possibilities on common goals is needed. The goals are so great and so important for our existence and our survival that they can be solved together. This is the ideology of the 27th CPSU Congress as outlined in Mr Gorbachev's Political Report. It is the ideology and the philosophy supported by this statesman's feeling of high responsibility for the further development of human civilization. There is no higher value than peace. Everything must be done to preserve peace and to give mankind a safe and productive future.

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CSO: 5200/1459



U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

ROME REPORT ON REMARKS BY USSR'S PETROVSKIY

PM021509 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 27 Jun 86 p 10 "

[Vincenzo Nigro report: "Moscow's Envoy in Chamber 'Hearing' Yesterday"]

[Excerpts] Rome--"Certainly we could go to a Reagan-Gorbachev summit, but only if we knew that it would serve to resolve at least a couple of problems, such as the dismantling of the missiles in Europe and the suspension of nuclear tests. I like art for art's sake, but dialogue for dialogue's sake is pointless; it is necessary to have tangible results." It could not have been clearer! The speaker was Vladimir Petrovskiy, ambassador of the USSR and right-hand man of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, or rather the foremost of the deputy ministers in that ministry. The team play of Soviet diplomacy works very well, and in this away match in Rome, too, Petrovskiy gave an exemplary demonstration of it: He faithfully followed the guidelines of the plan Gorbachev has entrusted to his envoys. Petrovskiy was in Rome at the invitation of the Chamber's Foreign Affairs Committee; Deputy Giorgio La Malfa, chairman of the committee, invited him to explain to the Italian deputies the USSR's foreign policy -- in particular, the state of East-West relations. Before him, U.S. Ambassador Paul Nitze was heard. There were no startling novelties, of course, but there was at least the opportunity to hear a firsthand source. Let us rapidly review the information supplied by the deputy foreign minister.

Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

Explaining that "a summit is not held just to get a photo in the newspapers," Petrovskiy confirmed that the Kremlin has not yet decided to say yes to the U.S. invitations seeking a meeting in December. "We cannot give any confirmation at this time; what is necessary is that there be an appropriate atmosphere. It is now said that the Americans will no longer observe SALT II; you can draw your own conclusions about the influence of that on the possible summit."

Geneva Negotiations

The deputy minister believes that it is possible to reach an agreement on the elimination of Euromissiles irrespective of the aspects concerning the negotiations on the U.S. space shield. This is good news for Europe, but who knows how Petrovskiy reacted in the late afternoon, when the agencies reported the first U.S.-British joint nuclear test in the Nevada desert.

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CSO: 5200/1459

CANADA: SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 17 Jul 86 p A3

[Text]

In a rare, informal media briefing Monday, the Soviet ambassador to Canada appealed for understanding in this country of the Soviet position on arms reduction.

Soviet ambassador Alexey Rodionov, just back from two weeks of high-level consultations in Moscow, told reporters that the Soviet leadership, under President Mikhail Gorbachev, "attaches great importance" to relations with Canada.

"Soviet-Canadian relations acquire a quite special importance today, at the present crucial period of a complex and dangerous situation."

Canada and the Soviet Union are still discussing a possible visit to Moscow later this year by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, said Rodionov, as well as exchange visits of high-level delegations, including a possible trip to Ottawa by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

No decision has been made on the visit by Shevardnadze, but plans are continuing for a Canadian parliamentary delegation to

travel to the Soviet Union.

Rodionov repeated that his country is "anxious, very much anxious, (about) the United States' Star Wars program," and called on the U.S. to respond seriously to the latest Soviet proposals to speed up arms-reductions talks.

At superpower nuclear arms talks in Geneva, the U.S. has refused to make Reagan's vision of a space-based missile defence a bargaining chip in negotiations on reducing strategic nuclear weapons.

Especially worrying to the Soviet Union is Reagan's decision to no longer respect the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). The ambassador called it "a dangerous measure in the American quest to destroy the current Soviet-American treaty structure (and) any grounds for future agreements and dialogue."

Much of the briefing was spent in denials by embassy officials that the Soviet Union has violated the terms of the Salt II, as charged by the U.S.

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CSO: 5220/45

## SALT/START ISSUES

### TASS CITES U.S., EUROPEAN CRITICS ON REAGAN SALT DECISION

Senator Gary Hart

LD202358 Moscow TASS in English 2222 GMT 20 Jun 86

[Text] Washington, 20 Jun (TASS)--The recent decision of the U.S. Administration to abandon the SALT II Treaty does not suit the interests of the United States national security.

This was pointed out by prominent American politician Senator Gary Hart. He became author of an amendment approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee that urges the White House to stay within the limits established by the SALT II Treaty.

The senator noted that this agreement promoted the consolidation of stability in Soviet-American relations, laid down the basis for achieving larger reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. Senator Hart stressed that the United States allies in Western Europe urged the President of the United States more than once to observe the limits set by the SALT II Treaty, but these requests were ignored. Senator said that this attitude to the opinion of the allies increases distrust for the United States policy.

UK Defense Minister

LD251625 Moscow TASS in English 0925 GMT 25 Jun 86

[Text] London, 25 Jun (TASS)--The United States should comply with the SALT II limits, said George Younger, the British defense minister, who is now staying on an official visit in the U.S.

Addressing a meeting organized in Washington by the Council on Foreign Relations, an American public organization, he said that the Europeans considered it important that the existing arms limitation agreements are complied with pending new accords in the arms control field.

According to REUTER, the decision of the Reagan Administration to end complying with SALT II caused indignation of Canada and of the U.S. allies in Western Europe who are of the opinion that the treaty is a break on the arms race.

French President Mitterand

LD051355 Moscow TASS in English 1334 GMT 5 Jul 86

[Text] New York July 5 TASS -- U.S. President Ronald Reagan met President Francois Mitterrand of France who arrived here to attend the celebrations of the Statue of Liberty centennial. The talks revealed that the sides held different positions on a number of major issues of world politics.

Upon the conclusion of the meeting, Larry Speakes, White House deputy press secretary, admitted in the talk with journalists that the French leader expressed disagreement with the recent U.S. decision to abandon compliance with the SALT-2 treaty. It followed from Speakes' pronouncements, that the outer space militarization plans hatched by Washington failed to win support of the French side.

At their meeting the U.S. and French leaders also discussed questions related to East-West relations. President Reagan noted the Soviet Union's striving for concluding an arms control agreement, according to the White House spokesman. In so doing, however, the head of the U.S. Administration again referred to the allegedly existing difficulties involved in the verification of compliance with such accords.

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CSO: 5200/1467

SALT/START ISSUES

PRAVDA: 'GLOBAL SHIELD' SHOWS 'POLITICAL IRRESPONSIBILITY'

PM011307 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jun 86 First Edition p 5

[Vladimir Bolshakov "Commentator's Column": "Airborne Neoglobalism"]

[Text] The U.S. newspaper SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS wrote a few days ago: "President Reagan is now following a hardline policy toward the USSR, which is reminiscent of a high-stakes poker game." This "gamble" by the White House takes extremely peculiar forms. Verbally, the White House issues all kinds of "conciliatory" statements. In fact, it embarks on actions aimed at stepping up confrontation with the USSR.

An example of this was provided by the Pentagon's latest provocative maneuvers, Global Shield-86, which recently ended. On the very first day of the maneuvers, a group of seven B-52 strategic bombers and five tanker aircraft made its way toward the USSR borders over the Aleutian Islands. It crossed the Bering Strait, turned back toward Alaska, and carried out a "bomb drop exercise" over Canadian and U.S. territory.

It is typical that these global maneuvers began soon after President Reagan's announcement of the U.S. decision not to observe the SALT II Treaty in the future. It is well known that, in violation of this treaty, the Pentagon is planning to exceed the ceiling for B-52 strategic bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. These missiles were tested during Global Shield-86.

An entire strategic aviation armada carrying nuclear weapons took to the air. Some 140 B-52 bombers and 135 tanker aircraft, stationed at U.S. Air Force bases in different parts of the world, took part in a global rehearsal of nuclear attack against the socialist countries. In addition, units of the U.S. Air Force reserve, the Canadian Navy, Marines, and Army, and the NORAD early warning system took part in Global Shield-86.

One cannot fail to see the direct link between these militaristic games and the doctrine of "neoglobalism" proclaimed by Washington. The desire by the organizers of this global provocation to demonstrate U.S. military might "to deter" the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is highly evident.

Even numerous U.S. observers and politicians now admit that, by undermining other people's security with its actions, Washington is placing its own country's security in jeopardy. In our nuclear age, this is an obvious display of political irresponsibility.

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CSO: 5200/1467

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### SOVIET MILITARY PAPER ON FRENCH MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 86 p 2

[Editorial: "With a Nuclear Charge"]

[Text] According to information from the journal ZOLDAT UND TEHNIK, testing of the ASMP medium range air-to-surface missile begun 3 years ago is nearing completion in France. They plan to put it in service this year.

The missile has a launch weight of about 900 kg, a wingspan of 0.96 meters, and a flight speed of up to Mach 3. The flight range during the tests was 100-145 km. The ASMP is equipped with a combination rocket-ramjet engine and an independent inertial guidance system. The missile's nuclear warhead has a yield of 100-150 kilotons.

The journal reported that the platform for the ASMP missile in France's strategic nuclear forces will be the Mirage-IVP. In essence this is a Mirage-IV medium strategic bomber equipped with a new radar, a ventral pylon, navigation equipment, and a panel for inflight targeting of the missile guidance system. Already this year the French Air Force plans to form two squadrons of nine Mirage-IVP each in the 91st Bomber Wing.

In naval aviation forces it is assumed that 50 of the 60 existing Super Etendard carrier aircraft will be refitted as ASMP platforms. There are also plans to equip tactical aviation with these missiles beginning in 1988 (the new Mirage-2000 N aircraft).

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CSO: 1801/181

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: NICARAGUA ACCUSES U.S. OF SPREADING ENCEPHALITIS

LD031723 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 3 Jul 86

[Text] Managua July 3 TASS -- Nicaraguan Health Minister Dora Maria Tellez said here at a press conference that the reason for the epidemic of viral encephalitis which flared up in the country, was definitely linked with anti-Nicaraguan actions of the CIA and the Pentagon. She noted that the U.S. administration had accumulated rich experience of waging bacteriological wars against other nations. It was quite probable, the minister emphasized, that the flareup of viral encephalitis was a link in this chain of crimes.

In 1985 the epidemic of dandy fever flared up in Nicaragua for the first time in the country's history. It affected several hundred thousand people. The republic government pointed out that that epidemic had been the result of a bacteriological war unleashed by Washington against the revolutionary republic.

According to the ministry of Health, foci of encephalitis were spotted in the capital and three departments in the country. The disease afflicted mostly children of junior and medium age. Measures are being taken to prevent the spread of the infection. Patients are receiving adequate medical assistance.

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CSO: 5200/1464

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

U.S.-SOVIET TALKS RESUME--Geneva, 1 Jul (TASS)--Soviet-American consultations on all aspects of the problem of concluding an effective and verifiable international convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons have been resumed here. The Soviet delegation is headed by Ambassador Viktor Israelyan, the U.S. delegation is led by Ambassador Donald Lowitz. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1554 GMT 1 Jul 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1464



EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET CSCE COMMITTEE HOLDS SESSION

PM271058 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For International Security and Cooperation"]

[Text] Mankind's most important task is to strengthen international security and avert the threat of nuclear war. This was noted 23 June in Moscow at a plenary session of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, which discussed the committee's tasks in the light of the 27th CPSU Congress decisions and the new Soviet peace initiatives.

The keynote speaker -- Committee Chairman L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union -- and other speakers noted the outstanding significance of the party congress in questions relating to the preservation of peace and disarmament. The all-embracing program for safeguarding universal security advanced by the congress is exceptionally important.

The speakers stressed that the Soviet public warmly supports the peace initiatives advanced by the Soviet leadership, CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the recent Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference, whose implementation opens up a practical opportunity for halting the current dangerous course of events and changing for the better the development of unfavorable trends in Europe and in the entire system of international relations. Decreasing the level of military confrontation in Europe is one of the decisive avenues in the struggle to prevent a nuclear war.

The session participants stated that at a time when the USSR and its allies are setting an example of honesty and sincere interest in improving the European and world political climate, the U.S. and NATO ruling circles are essentially ignoring the Soviet Union's constructive proposals. The United States' renunciation of its SALT II commitments and its decision to continue nuclear tests and make preparations for "star wars" deserve condemnation.

The Soviet public will continue to make efforts in the struggle for the complete elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in the European zone on a reciprocal basis and for the achievement of concrete accords at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms and on other topical problems relating to the stabilization of the international situation.

Having listened to a briefing by Yu.B. Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation in Bern, the session participants expressed indignation that the United States, in defiance of universal aspirations, thwarted the adoption of agreed recommendations on humanitarian questions, displaying flagrant disregard for Europeans' interests and for the implementation of the Helsinki accords.

The session adopted a statement. It stresses that the Soviet public, expressing a willingness for dialogue on vitally important questions of war and peace with all European peace-loving forces who hold our continent's fate dear, calls them to vigorous joint or parallel actions for the sake of preserving life and human civilization.

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CSO: 5200/1460

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### TASS REPORTS DELEGATE SPEECHES AT JULY CD SESSION

LD042215 Moscow TASS in English 2030 GMT 4 Jul 86

[Text] Geneva, 4 Jul (TASS)--Various aspects of the problem of averting nuclear war, of curbing the arms race are in the focus of attention of the conference on disarmament which is under way here.

Head of the USSR delegation Viktor Israelyan stressed in his speech that many recent events, above all the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station, lifted the veil from what threatens humanity in the event of nuclear catastrophe. The Soviet Union has advanced a complex of proposals for the creation of an international regime of safe development of nuclear energetics on the basis of close cooperation of all states. This question is the prerogative of IAEA. But this problem has the other side to it: ban on the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes through the use of radiological weapons and through attacking nuclear facilities.

And the conference on disarmament must make a weighty contribution to the solution of this problem.

Head of the GDR delegation Harald Rose emphasized that the conference must finally embark on practical talks on nuclear disarmament. The proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provide the basis for such talks. These are, above all the stage-by-stage program of nuclear disarmament advanced by the Soviet Union, as well as the proposals contained in the final documents of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states in Budapest.

There is no sphere where the United States short-sighted policy would not be undermining what has been achieved in the sphere of disarmament, said head of the Polish delegation Stanislaw Turbanski. The United States refuses to conduct talks on a ban on nuclear weapon testing. It is developing ever new types of nuclear arms. It is unwilling to observe the existing agreements curbing the nuclear arms race, above all, the SALT II Treaty and the ABM Treaty. And now the U.S. has embarked on the "star wars" program.

Head of Morocco's delegation El Ghali Benima [TASS spelling] pointed to the need to bar the road to the creation of new types of arms, specifically space strike arms which will inevitably undermine the strategic stability in the world that is fragile as it is. It was emphasized in this connection that the special committee of the conference on the question of preventing an arms race in space should embark without delay upon practical talks aimed at the prevention of the emplacement of armaments in space.

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CSO: 5200/1460

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: REPORTS, COMMENTARY ON END OF MBFR SESSION

Soviet on Pact Proposal

LD031306 Moscow TASS in English 1253 GMT 3 Jul 86

[Text] Vienna July 3 TASS -- TASS correspondent Dmitriy Fadayev reports:

A regular round of Vienna talks on mutual reduction of troops and armaments in central Europe ended today. The delegation of the Soviet Union addressed the plenary meeting on behalf of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

The Soviet delegation stated that the main cause of the complicated and tense situation the talks are being held in lies in the confrontation character of the policy of some Western powers.

The socialist states, being aware of their responsibility for the well-being of their people, and for the future of universal security, are exerting the utmost efforts to preserve and strengthen peace, to put an end to the arms race and to fundamentally improve the international situation.

Special attention was drawn to the Budapest address of the Warsaw Treaty member-states.

It contains a programme of large-scale reduction all over Europe of armed forces and conventional armaments, including tactical strike aviation and nuclear operational-tactical systems, this testifying to the socialist states' readiness to reduce and restrict the arms race in all directions.

Resolved in the context of real disarmament would also be questions of control with the use of international procedures, including on-site verification, and a possibility of elaborating and implementing certain measures to strengthen the confidence that neither side will undertake sudden offensive operations.

The Budapest proposals are an important supplement to the Soviet January 15, 1986 programme [as received] for removing the nuclear threat and eliminating weapons of mass destruction. But these are, meanwhile, independent proposals. Their implementation would, undoubtedly, facilitate lessening the danger of war and promote real detente in Europe.

The Warsaw Treaty member countries reaffirmed their interest in reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe. They stressed that attainment of mutually acceptable accords at the Vienna talks would also promote consolidation of all-European security. Unfortunately, the state of affairs at the Vienna talks is unconsoling comforting [as received]. No consent has so far been reached even on the material content of the supposed agreement.

Having outwardly accepted the scheme of the socialist countries' proposal on the initial reduction of Soviet and American troops in central Europe and a subsequent non-rise in the levels of troops and armaments of the sides in that region, the Western participants distorted it and filled it with such a content which calls in question once again a possibility of reaching an accord. The variant of agreement proposed by the West is of a deformed character. Arbitrary manipulations around control and verification of a still non-existent agreement are being made in place of solution of the pressing task of ending and restricting the arms race, reducing the level of military confrontation, stabilizing the military-political situation and, consequently, building up confidence.

Contrary to the implication of the mandate of the Vienna talks, the Western side is reducing everything to the insignificant reduction and subsequent non-increase only of the numerical strength of the armed forces.

But even this limited commitment interests it only as a pretext for advancing a far-fetched, but practically and technically unfeasible problem of counting the numerical strength of the troops.

Besides, this undertaking is being accompanied by such verification terms which lead to the unjustified exposure of the entire defence structure of states down to a battalion and individual barracks, and to serious interference in their internal affairs, although this is not necessitated by the requirements of the proposed agreement.

The Western references to the principle of reciprocity are groundless. Here is one example. Is the requirement for equivalency of the obligations of the sides met by the West's insistence on spreading the verification measures beyond the region of reductions, including to a whole number of the Soviet Union's Western military districts under the pretext that, allegedly, that territory adjoins the region of the reductions?

Why not then spread this measure to the territory of all NATO countries adjoining the regions of reductions from the West? If one looks at the situation strategically, there emerges the question of U.S. territory.

As early as six years ago, the socialist countries pointed to the arbitrary character and unacceptability of the Western "package" of verification measures.

The Western side, however, has not only failed to make any constructive changes whatsoever to its position on verification, but has even toughened it more. This kind of position on the part of the NATO countries can attest only to one thing -- the aspiration to keep the talks deadlocked.

It is thus impossible to improve the prospects of the Vienna talks without a serious readjustment of the Western position towards realism, balance and readiness to look for mutually acceptable compromises. We stick to the viewpoint that the implementation of the February 20, 1986, draft agreement of the socialist countries would be the best

result that can be achieved in the current situation at the Vienna talks. Its principal meaning is to turn, finally, from words to deeds and make a practical start, however modest, towards ending and restricting the arms race. Its elements have been thoroughly balanced and take into account the security interests of both sides.

The entirety of our verification measures duly corresponds to the material content of the proposed agreement, and is not separated from it. It assures the two sides of confidence about compliance with the agreement commitments. The control and verification measures themselves were formulated in the draft of the socialist countries on the basis of their equivalency for both sides, which excludes the possibility of abusing them for the purposes contradicting equal security and improvement of relations.

The draft of the socialist countries is quite an appropriate foundation for bringing the Vienna talks to a mutually acceptable positive result.

#### Western Attitude Hit

LD062015 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1903 GMT 6 Jul 86

[V. Mikheyev report; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The latest round of talks on mutual armed forces and armaments reductions in central Europe has ended in Vienna.

This is the last plenary session of the Vienna talks. The atmosphere in which they were taking place remains difficult. The reason for this is the confrontational character of certain Western powers' foreign policies. Instead of a desire for accords on troop and armament reductions, NATO countries would like merely to gain the opportunity of monitoring and checking the troops of the socialist countries. The socialist countries are doggedly defending the only reasonable position, to reach agreement on troop and weapons reductions, and then to monitor the observance of those accords.

#### U.S. Seeks 'Confrontation'

LD042053 Moscow TASS in English 1948 GMT 4 Jul 86

["Barriers and Straight Road in Vienna"--TASS item identifier]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Jul (TASS)--TASS news analyst Vyacheslav Chernyshov writes:

The latest round of talks on armed forces and armaments reduction in central Europe just ended in Vienna.

NATO countries showed again their unwillingness to seek mutually acceptable solutions aimed at lowering military confrontation in the centre of the European Continent. Washington now tries to mislead the world, to shift the blame for the stalemate in Vienna on the Warsaw Treaty countries. According to a statement of White House Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes, it is caused by "a disinclination to respond constructively to NATO offer of December 5, 1985".

Such an assertion runs counter to facts. Even from the view point of formal logic, it is NATO countries that were to give an answer since on February 20 of this year socialist countries submitted their new proposals -- a detailed draft "agreement on Initial Reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of Land Forces and Armaments with the Subsequent Non-Increase of the Levels of the Armed Forces and Armaments and Related Measures in Central Europe." From an informal view point, too, it is Western participants in the talks who are to give the answer, since the draft agreement of socialist countries proposes compromise solutions on a number of principled aspects, having taken into account all acceptable elements of the Western stand. New important steps have been taken by socialist countries also on the question of reasonable verification of the implementation of the agreement.

Thus, it was proposed to establish for the whole period of the operation of the agreement permanent check points for controlling the entry of troops into cut-back area. On-site inspections on justifiable requests and creation of an appropriate mechanism of consultations are also envisaged.

But the stand of NATO countries remains an obstacle to overcoming the drawn-out stalemate in Vienna. The West's unwillingness to reduce arms should be emphasized particularly, even though arms reduction is clearly proclaimed in the mandate and in the very name of the talks. Western participants are also speculating on the problems of verification. Many things indicate that NATO countries would like to replace the task of lowering the level of military confrontation in the centre of Europe with such measures of control as are not commensurate either with nature, or the contents of a possible agreement, or with real need for the verification of its implementation.

Against the background of large-scale initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty countries, the nonconstructiveness of the stand of the Western participants is seen with participants clarity. It was declared from our side at the summit level that alongside removing weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of states it is necessary to start agreed upon reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, and that arrangement at the Vienna talks might become a signal for the movement in this direction.

The broadest ever promising base for the solution of this problem has been created. The Warsaw Treaty states have worked out and advanced a concrete programme of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Alongside the implementation of the mandate of the Vienna talks that limits the cut-back area to central Europe, the discussion of the question of reductions in a large geographic area could be started without delay at a special forum of European countries, the USA and Canada. Socialist countries are prepared for their large-scale proposals becoming the subject of concrete discussion at the second stage of the Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. They do not preclude the possibility of widening the framework of the Vienna talks through drawing in them other European states and changing the mandate of the talks accordingly.

But neither the positive advance in Vienna nor the choice of one of the proposed variants suit certain Western circles.



Their opinion was candidly expressed by the U.S. defence secretary who warned Washington's West European allies about the need for a greater caution toward any plans of socialist countries about altering the structure of forces in Europe. Weinberger said it is important to realise that this should be resisted. What the Pentagon needs is not the reduction of armed forces and armaments, but their buildup in Europe. On its insistence, the year 1983 was the year of NATO's nuclear "rearming" and the year 1984 that of its non-nuclear "rearming". Material base for the so-called "Rodgers' Plan" is now created at a high pace in NATO countries. The plan envisages the possibilities of dealing "deep strikes" at the rear and "the second echelon" in the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries.

Certain persons in the West cannot give up the dogma of thinking in categories of confrontation, cannot give up futile intentions of achieving military superiority. Transoceanic diktat shackles political will of certain West European governments. But will must be manifested, above all in West European countries that are in the very centre of the policy of confrontation pursued by NATO at the junction of the two blocs. Only then is a breakthrough at the Vienna talks and a change in favour in detente in the continent possible.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: CHERVOV, PETROVSKIY PRESS CONFERENCE ON PACT APPEAL

PM021217 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Jul 86 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 1 July. The conference was devoted to the Warsaw Pact appeal to the NATO states and all European countries setting forth a program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe.

A statement on this subject delivered by V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, emphasized that it was a program for movement along yet another route on the map of highways leading to a lessening of the war danger.

Seeking to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons within the current century, the USSR and its allies consider it necessary to back up these efforts with substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional arms. The recent accidents at Chernobyl and at Hamm in the FRG have also drawn our urgent attention to another factor -- that of the existence of a dense network of peaceful nuclear installations that if damaged, even by conventional weapons, could be a source of unprecedented danger. The new program, while complementing the efforts to eliminate mass destruction weapons, is a completely independent program and has no linkage to other issues. In essence, the program represents a substantial, genuinely tangible, one-fourth reduction -- that is, an aggregate of 1 million men on both sides -- in ground forces and tactical strike aviation in Europe together with the corresponding nuclear arms. As an initial step it is proposed to carry out a one-time mutual reduction of 100,000-150,000 men on each side in the numerical strength of the forces of the rival groups within the next 2 years.

The program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms put forward by the Warsaw Pact states is addressed to Europe not only because the two major military groups confront each other here but also because, by virtue of its experience in the political solution of the problems of all-European cooperation accumulated here, the continent has every opportunity of playing the role as the site for building detente and setting a good example to other areas of the world.

We cannot fail to be concerned at the official reaction of those to whom the socialist countries' new proposals have been addressed, the deputy minister noted. They have been saying for 3 weeks now that these proposals need to be studied but, judging by appearances, these studies have so far failed to produce even a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.

At the same time the U.S. and NATO bloc war machine continues to gather momentum. It is illustrative that as far as the ruling circles in the West are concerned the question of postponing the implementation of military programs has not even arisen. The gulf that has formed between the lack of progress toward agreement at the arms limitation talks and the feverish military preparations of the United States and its closest allies is widening. At the same time the fabric of existing agreements, if they present an obstacle to the implementation of arms buildup programs such as SALT II, is being destroyed.

Time does not stand still, and lip service to arms limitation and professions of love and peace are not needed, practical action is.

In their replies to journalists V.F. Petrovskiy and Colonel-General N.F. Chervov, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate, explained that the reduction of the troop groups by an aggregate of more than 1 million men on both sides would, in a certain respect, resolve the task of lowering the level of military confrontation and the danger of war in Europe. In addition, it is envisaged that the process of reduction could continue further. The initial reduction (by 100,000-150,000 men each) would put the political will of the sides to the test, would create a certain amount of confidence between them, and would make it possible to test the system of verification [kontrol].

This system, including international procedures down to on-the-spot inspections, is an integral part of the program. In addition to measures to verify [proverka] the reductions themselves, monitoring [nablyudeniye za] of the military activity of the remaining troops would be established. There is no room here either for a "numerical problem." Provision is made for an exchange of numerical data, both of a general nature and in respect of specific parameters.

The journalists' attention was drawn to the fact that the program stipulates that the participants in the proposed agreement refrain from increasing ground forces or tactical strike aviation either on the territories of the USSR and the United States or in other parts of the world.

It was noted that in addition to the reduction of conventional arms, the program makes provision for the reduction of operational-tactical nuclear weapons with the range of up to 1,000 km. This question favors the implementation of the Soviet plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

Other questions put by journalists were also answered.

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## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### SOVIET COLONEL HITS WESTERN CRITIQUES OF PACT PROPOSALS

PM071606 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel of the Reserve V. Chernyshev under the rubric "Policy of Peace Against Policy of War": "Now It Is Up to NATO to Respond"]

[Text] The European Continent, which has been turned into an arena of bloody wars on many occasions through the centuries, is now the epicenter of military confrontation between the two military-political alliances. The concentration of troops and armaments here has reached a particularly dangerous level. The reduction of this confrontation and the prevention of the threat of war now constitute an immediate political and military-strategic task of exceptional importance.

Taking into account the situation prevailing in the continent and in the world, the Warsaw Pact states adopted, at the Political Consultative Committee conference, an address to NATO states and all European countries containing a program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. This program is highly important by virtue of its effect on a wide range of factors.

First, it constitutes a weighty supplement to the program, put forward by the Soviet Union, for the complete liquidation of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons everywhere by the end of this century. The factor of the interconnection of nuclear and nonnuclear means plays a considerable role. Given a comprehensive approach, in other words a parallel process of liquidating mass destruction weapons and considerably reducing armed forces and conventional armaments, reductions in one sphere would stimulate progress in the other.

Second, the elaboration of relevant accords in line with this program would make it possible to reduce the groups of armed forces in Europe by more than 1 million men by the early nineties. A significant reduction of the tactical strike aviation of both military-political alliances in Europe and a reduction of the concentration of troops along the line of contact at the very outset would lead to the diminution of the danger of surprise attack, a buildup of mutual confidence, and the consolidation of stability on the European Continent.

Third, a start would be made on the reduction of nuclear weapons of an operational-tactical designation with a range (operational radius) of up to 1,000 km, since the reduction of formations and units would also involve the reduction of their standard complement of weapons [shtatnyye cooruszhniya], including nuclear ones.

Fourth, the reductions zone proposed by the socialist countries --from the Atlantic to the Urals -- offers an opportunity to considerably expand international cooperation in the sphere of ensuring security in Europe through active participation by all Warsaw pact and NATO countries. After all, some of these countries are now taking part in, for example, the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe with only a consultative vote.

Fifth, the European countries that do not belong to the military-political alliances, in other words the neutral and nonaligned states, will now be able to take part in talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and in the verification [kontrol] of the execution of all decisions. The Finnish press, for example, emphasizes that the Warsaw Pact states' proposal offers Finland a wonderful opportunity to galvanize its foreign policy and to contribute by all means toward the implementation of this initiative.

Sixth, by means of their initiatives, the socialist countries have demonstrated once more the groundlessness of the "argument" by Western opponents of detente -- the argument about supposed "failure to provide" verification [kontrol] measures in the disarmament proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact states. For example, this "argument" has been constantly used by NATO countries to camouflage their unconstructive stance at the Vienna talks. The mass media in the West are now singling out in particular the verification [kontrol] measures proposed by the socialist countries, including international procedures up to on-site inspections. "This is the key to breaking the deadlock at the Vienna talks," the West German newspaper WESTFLISCHE RUNDSCHAU declared, for example.

On the whole, as THE WASHINGTON POST noted, the proposed program "combines the Soviet arms control proposals in a single whole formulated in order to attract the attention of the Western public." The new Warsaw Pact proposals, Japan's NIHON KEIZAI wrote, are obviously attractive for Western Europe. The USSR and its allies have boosted the growing belief in Europe that the East, not the West, is really interested in disarmament, America's ABC-TV concluded.

Many politicians, public figures, and mass media in Western Europe offer objective assessments of the conference results and the initiatives put forward. The proposals must be positively evaluated insofar as they contain a number of constructive elements, H.-J. Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany faction in the FRG Bundestag, declared. J. Rau, prime minister of North Rhein-Westphalia and candidate for federal chancellor in the FRG elections, emphasized that the Soviet Union is really interested in a disarmament dialogue and that the West must not take this as a sign of weakness. It is necessary to take advantage of this opportunity, not to ignore the "signals" from the East, and not to leave them without response, he called.

At the same time, certain circles in Washington and some other NATO captials are attempting to discredit the socialist countries' proposals, to diminish their attractiveness in the eyes of the people, and to downgrade and raise doubts about the main point -- the feasibility of military detente in Europe. Some U.S. "experts," unwilling to deviate from their well-trodden path despite the actual facts, claim that the Warsaw Pact proposals supposedly "do not take the Western point of view into account," "contain nothing new," are "unrealistic," and so on. What has given rise to such [word indistinct]? The answer to this question was given by Britain's DAILY MAIL: "The large scale of the program proposed by the Warsaw Pact has stunned NATO observers."

The main point, however, is evidently their total unwillingness to effect any reductions of armed forces and armaments at all. It is, after all, the United States and NATO that have been keeping the Vienna talks idling for almost 13 years now.

At official level, the NATO countries did not, on this occasion, bring themselves to reject outright the new initiatives by the Warsaw Pact states. Hitherto, their reaction has boiled down to just one point: promises to give these initiatives "serious study." U.S. President R. Reagan declared his "interest in studying them," and Vice President G. Bush declared that "some of their aspects are promising, and we welcome them." According to a statement by a Netherlands Foreign Ministry spokesman, his government believes that the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals must be evaluated positively.

At the same time one can already perceive in statements by representatives of NATO countries and of the United States in particular, an unwillingness to depart from the old unconstructive stance. U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in particular declared that "the very first step toward reduction must make provision for larger reductions of their (the Warsaw Pact countries' -- V. Ch.) forces compared with ours, since their forces are numerically stronger."

There is no real justification for such statements insofar as approximate equality of armed forces and armaments between NATO and the Warsaw Pact does exist in Europe. These statements are based on the unrealistic desire to obtain military advantages both by building up their own armaments and at the negotiation table. This is an obviously hopeless task.

The socialist countries will not allow anyone to perceive them as Lebensraum [zhiznennoye prostranstvo] for alien appetites and revanchist aspirations. But we do say to the West: Seriously accept our proposals for the liquidation of medium-range nuclear missile weapons, seriously accept the proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments -- and an opportunity will emerge to substantially ease tension in the continent. Our troops are not permanently anchored in other countries. But the anchors must be weighed simultaneously and by everyone.

The future will show whether the NATO countries are prepared to take a realistic path and abandon their claims to military superiority. It is perfectly clear that the fate of peace must not be left in the hands of imperialism, nor must imperialist reaction be allowed to impose an aggravation of the military-political confrontation upon mankind. This would mean only one thing -- a slide toward nuclear war. "Peace can be preserved," Conrade M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his speech at the 10th PZPR Congress, "only through joint efforts by all states and all people."

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## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### PRAVDA HITS WESTERN STANCE AT CDE ON NOTIFICATION

PM081539 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondent M. Kostikov: "Time for Decisions To Strengthen Confidence and Security in Europe"]

[Text] Stockholm, Jun -- The sun glints on the glass facade of Stockholm's "Kulturhuset" which faces the square called Sergelstorg. The ground floor acts as the capital's busy social and cultural center. The top floor is in the hands of international politicians and experts. It is housing the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The present stage began on 10 June with, as they say here, the "wind in its favor." It is hoped here in the "Kulturhuset" that the new peace initiatives by the Warsaw Pact states, proclaimed in Budapest in the appeal signed by the leaders of the allied socialist countries, will accelerate the "ship of talks." Their program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and the proposed measures on strengthening mutual confidence have a direct bearing on the aims of the Stockholm conference.

This important international forum has already completed most of its journey. Some 2 and 1/2 years of hard work have been completed. The two final sessions are to come. Can one expect success? How substantive will the final document be?

After a long period of marking time, the range of questions to be incorporated in the final document was finally decided last fall. The list contains, in particular, the topics of advance notification of military activity, exchange of observers and annual plans for military activity, and the limitation of the latter's scale. One important point is the question of nonuse of force in international relations and its specific application to the European Continent. These advances were achieved as a result of persistent efforts by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The businesslike, constructive position of the group of neutral and nonaligned states has also contributed to progress in Stockholm.

A second important step was the creation of a mechanism for preparing and elaborating the final accords. Since the beginning of 1986 five working groups have been functioning under the leadership of coordinators from neutral and nonaligned countries. But the elaboration of accords is proceeding slowly, and it relates not so much to the central question as to peripheral, secondary matters. This is basically due to the destructive position of the United States and its closest allies. Washington's



rhetoric and the hardening of the U.S. foreign policy line are evident here too, in Stockholm. The absence of reciprocal steps by the NATO countries toward the achievement of accords and toward the quest for solutions to unresolved problems is accompanied by a patent desire to use the conference to acquire one-sided advantages. When this does not happen, the NATOites, with a vigor worthy of better application, start erecting artificial barriers and try to tighten the knots of contradictions and lead the conference into an impasse.

By what they say the diplomats from the United States and other NATO countries seem to be in favor of the USSR's proposal on solving the problem of providing notification of major military exercises in two parts, that is, agreeing now to give notification of major ground and air force exercises, leaving the question of naval activity to the next stage of the conference.

But in fact, they are placing in its path a palisade of self-seeking provisos. For example, they have refused outright to give notification of independent aircraft activity [samostoyatel'naya deyatel'nost' aviatsii]. The United States is still trying to keep the transfer of forces to the European zone outside the notification framework.

In view of the crucial nature of the present decisive stage of elaboration of the final document, the Soviet delegation put forward in the previous session specific proposals to contribute to the achievement of success. They related to notification of major exercises by ground forces -- to be conducted both independently or jointly with any components of air or naval forces, amphibious or airborne forces -- with the simultaneous indication of the number of divisions, as well as of independent exercises by aircraft.

How do things stand at the conference regarding such fundamental confidence and security issues as the nonuse of force principle put forward at the initiative of the socialist countries? From the very start the NATOites resisted discussion on this topic in every way. Ultimately they have had to consent both to its examination and to the formulation of the text of an accord. Here too, however, that same approach was discernible: verbal consent and, in practice, stubborn opposition to the solution of problems.

Now, as we near the end of the present stage of the conference, 19 September, the time has come for the participants to display the proper statesmanlike approach and will for a political solution in the interests of strengthening security and world peace.

In the 11 June 1986 Budapest appeal to the NATO states and all European countries the Warsaw Pact states once again advocated the fruitful completion of the first stage of the Stockholm conference. According to many observers in the "Kulturhuset," the proposals put forward in that major document, including the one on measures on strengthening confidence and security and on disarmament on our continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals, can give dynamic momentum to the current phase of the Stockholm conference's work and contribute to its fruitful completion. There was interest here in the idea expressed in the appeal that the proposals on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe could be a specific topic of discussion at the second stage of the Stockholm forum.



The results of the current stage of the conference will be an indicator of the readiness primarily of the European states themselves to ensure the strengthening of confidence and security on the continent. A positive outcome at the conference would be a new stimulus to the development of all aspects of the all-European process that began in Helsinki and would help to improve the world political climate.

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## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### TASS MILITARY ANALYST DECRIES EUROPEAN ARMS BUILDUP

LD081504 Moscow TASS in English 1437 GMT 8 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 8 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshov writes:

Much interest is displayed in the Soviet-French summit dialogue in Europe and in the world as a whole. The interest is only natural: The situation imperatively calls for a new thinking, for the rejection of outdated concepts and for awareness of utmost responsibility for the future. Those on the other side of the ocean are still regarding Europe as a theatre of operations, a battleground of every sort of "limited" wars, nuclear and conventional. This political thinking, however, is hopelessly outdated.

In Europe there are two three-million-strong troop groupings with advanced tanks, missiles, planes, helicopters, anti-missile systems and other weapons and combat technology: 94 combat-ready NATO divisions (counting French and Spanish forces) and 78 divisions of the Warsaw Treaty countries. There are colossal stockpiles of nuclear weapons: The West European arsenals alone contain more than 7,000 nuclear munitions. These are just some figures illustrating what is usually referred to as armed confrontation in Europe. Moreover, conventional weapons are being constantly improved and becoming more and more sophisticated and powerful, which makes them similar in their effects to weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear arms arsenals are being constantly upgraded. New American medium-range missiles continue to be deployed in the West European NATO countries and the British and French nuclear arms arsenals are being modernized.

West Germany is intensively whipping up its war preparations.

Any war, nuclear or conventional, is extremely dangerous to the European Continent. Just a few conventional shells falling on any of its 150 atomic reactors or hundreds of chemical plants will cause countless deaths even without the use of nuclear weapons. Any armed conflict, nuclear or conventional, in Europe could trigger world catastrophe. This fuse must be removed! Our continent, which has seen the horrors of many wars, and which has accumulated valuable experience of peaceful cooperation among states with different social systems, now has every opportunity to set an example for the coexistence of sovereign, different but peaceful states, aware of their interdependence and building their relations on trust.

The main path to this goal goes through the delivery of Europe from the explosive burden of armaments. Is this task realistic for Europe? Yes, it is. Europe has sufficient economic and political potentialities firmly and confidently to speak for

itself, to decide its problems and to seek progress at all the talks. Large-scale Soviet initiatives, including a program for the development of a comprehensive system of international security, a program for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction before the end of the current century, concrete proposals for the removal of medium-range missiles from Europe and a detailed plan for reductions in the armed forces and conventional armaments in the continent from the Atlantic to the Urals, offer a realistic base for a search for mutually acceptable steps to strengthen European and world security.

The implementation of the Soviet proposals makes it possible to remove in practice all the fears, both hypocritical and real, regarding the imbalance of forces in any type of weaponry between the confronting military groups.

The USSR has just called for taking a fresh look at the problem of lowering the conventional balance of forces. There is known to exist rough parity in conventional armaments in Europe. It does not mean, of course, complete equality in the numbers of divisions and armaments of every type. The armed forces of the sides are diversified and differently organized. Spokesman for the NATO countries often use this circumstance to justify their unwillingness to reduce the armed forces and armaments -- one example of such approach is the Western position at the Vienna talks.

Refusing to consider arms cuts, NATO officials usually claimed that it was very difficult to collate diverse types of armaments and to work out "equivalents" for their comparison. Now this artificial argument has been brushed aside: The Soviet Union stated that the West should reduce those weapons in which it has superiority whereas the USSR will not hesitate to cut back the surplus in those weapons in which a Soviet superiority exists.

Another steps has thus been taken in a truly mutual search for a balance of forces at a lower level.

This task is both realistic and urgent and the Soviet Union has every right to expect a positive and concrete response from the West. Given political will in the NATO countries, Europe could play a special role in a drastic turnaround towards a policy of peace.

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CSO: 5200/1460

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### SOVIET, POLISH FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS EUROPEAN ISSUES

LD031509 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jul 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, who is taking part in the 10th PZPR Congress, met 3 July with Marian Orzechowski, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and Polish minister of foreign affairs, and other leading officials of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and leading officials of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During an exchange of views certain current international problems were examined, as were bilateral relations of mutual interest. It was noted that in the present complex international situation, the socialist countries are fully determined to actively struggle against the military threat and for the democratization of the whole system of international relations and its radical reorganization on the basis of comprehensive security equal for all. This foreign policy course of the socialist community was again convincingly confirmed in the report delivered by Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, to the 10th party congress, and in the speech at the congress of Polish Communists by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The two sides registered with satisfaction with activization of coordinated actions by the socialist countries on the international arena. The conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Budapest became an important stage on the way toward further strengthening their cooperation.

The ministers called for a successful conclusion to the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, and emphasized the importance of the forthcoming Vienna meeting of representatives of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The aims of détente in Europe would also be served by reaching mutually acceptable accords at the Vienna talks on mutual armed forces and weapons reductions in Central Europe.

The firm intention of the USSR and the Polish People's Republic is to actively strive together with the other fraternal countries for the implementation of a coordinated foreign policy course aimed at removing the threat of nuclear war and strengthening general peace.

The conversation passed in a friendly and cordial atmosphere, typical of relations between the two countries.

[Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1405 GMT on 3 July carries this item and the following significant variation in the last sentence is noted: "The conversation passed in a friendly and frank atmosphere, typical of relations..."("cordial" reading "frank")]

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CSO: 5200/1460

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### PRAVDA SEES SHULTZ PACIFIC-FAR EAST TOUR AS UNSUCCESSFUL

#### 'Dissatisfaction' on NFZS

PM071400 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jul 86 First Edition p 5

[Dmitriy Kosyrev "Commentator's Column": "Unscrupulous Methods"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz has made a tour of Pacific countries. It is not the first such trip by the head of the U.S. foreign policy department. But the timing of the visit and the problems discussed during it have attracted particular attention.

The point is that in recent months Washington has been expressing more and more obvious concern and even dissatisfaction with the development of events in that large region. The White House was particularly alarmed by the fact that 13 states in the South Pacific have announced the creation of a nuclear-free zone and are planning to ratify a treaty to that effect in August. New Zealand, which, like the United States, is a member of the ANZUS military bloc, is among the most active advocates of the creation of the zone. This country has been annoying Washington for a long time now with its antinuclear policy.

The decision by the Pacific Ocean countries met with a widespread response in Southeast Asia. Recently these states have also been expressing their intention to set up a nuclear-free zone. The ASEAN foreign ministers, meeting in Manila, came out in favor of this the other day.

All this is taking place at the very time when the United States is elaborating extensive plans for the further militarization of the Pacific region: the creation of new military bases there, the use of existing facilities for "star wars" preparations, and the buildup of the Navy's nuclear arsenals. Encountering mounting resistance to its neoglobalist policy in that part of the world, Washington is doing its utmost to stem the antinuclear tide there.

This was the purpose of G. Shultz' trip. But, to all appearances, the results achieved by the secretary of state were not great. His talks with New Zealand Prime Minister D. Lange ended in another failure. "Incompatible views," "No progress achieved" -- these were the statements after the meeting.

31 July 1986

In an effort to strengthen Washington's positions and influence G. Shultz signed in Manila an agreement to give the country the long promised \$200 million rental for the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. In Singapore the secretary of state zealously publicized the "star wars" plans in an attempt to get his interlocutors to back the U.S. course. It was there that he attacked the idea of creating nuclear-free zones.

Neither the promises of generous aid nor the overt pressure have so far produced the desired result. The people of the Pacific countries are increasingly determined to be rid of Washington's dangerous "tutelage." It was no coincidence that Shultz was greeted in Manila by angry demonstrators carrying placards saying: "Beat it and take your military aid with you!"

The results of the U.S. secretary of state's trip demonstrated the mounting condemnation in the region of Washington's policy which is coming into more and more obvious conflict with the interests and aspirations of the population of the Pacific countries.

### 'Commotion' Over New Zealand

PM071459 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jul 86 First Edition p 5

[Vladimir Bolshakov article under the rubric "Our Commentary": "Banging the Table"]

[Text] The other day a U.S. State Department representative publicly threatened New Zealand with the "possibility" of breaking off diplomatic relations.

So just what triggered this commotion? When Labor headed by D. Lange won the New Zealand elections 2 years ago, Wellington announced that henceforth U.S. warship carrying nuclear weapons would not be allowed into New Zealand ports. The Pentagon recoiled and stated that this decision undermined the treaty of the ANZUS bloc, of which New Zealand had been a member since 1951 along with the United States and Australia. "Arm-twisting" of the recalcitrant partner began. Both propaganda "shock therapy" -- scaremongering using the "soviet threat" -- and economic sanctions, which have hit New Zealand farmers hard, have been actively used in this "operation." Finally, the White House recently threatened to "nullify U.S. obligations with regard to the safeguarding of New Zealand's security."

This was followed by a meeting in Manila between U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz and Prime Minister D. Lange. Shultz reaffirmed the White House's threat, and Lange his position. On that they parted, G. Shultz claiming that they "parted as friends." In that case why was there an outcry from the department he heads?

The fact is that D. Lange stated after the meeting: "We New Zealanders do not believe that the Soviet Union poses a military threat to our country. As for other countries' security interests, they should be determined by those states themselves. But New Zealand's security interests are best served by an absence of nuclear weapons on its territory."

It was this statement that triggered the latest storm in Washington, where such ideas are invariably described as seditious. According to the present administration's "logic," all U.S. allies should believe in the "Soviet threat" as if it were Holy Writ. They should believe just as devoutly in the Americans' "right" to decide at will how its partners in military blocs should be concerned about own security.

New Zealand, like a number of other allied U.S. countries, rightly believes that its own ideas about national security need not necessarily comply with those of Washington. It was no accident that the National Labor Party Conference in Wellington sounded a warning not so long ago: "Participation in ANZUS can only bring a catastrophe down upon us if Reagan and his generals unleash a nuclear war."

New Zealand has not left ANZUS. It remains linked to the United States ideologically, politically, economically, and militarily. Therefore, the Washington table-banging was all the more insulting for the country. It was yet further evidence that the United States by no means intends to take note of its partners' interests or to respect their political course.

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CSO: 5200/1461



## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### SOVIET COMMENTARIES ASSAIL U.S. ON TEST BAN TREATY ANNIVERSARY

#### CTB Treaty Unratified

LD032246 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Jul 86

[Commentary by political commentator Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Today marks the 12th anniversary of the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of underground testing of nuclear weapons. We now go to our political commentator Aleksandr Zholkver:

[Zholkver] Let me remind you that at the time this treaty was signed in Moscow, nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space were already prohibited. Our country tried to obtain their full prohibition. However, the United States refused to do this. Then, as a compromise, it was agreed at least to limit underground tests both to a capacity of no more than 150 kilo tons and in numbers, establishing that tests should be at a minimum. This was precisely the basic content of the treaty to which leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States put their names.

At the same time they announced the intention to continue negotiations with the aim of achieving an accord to end all tests and generally on ending the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. Well, what happened? The treaty was never ratified by the United States and for the same reason that 5 years later they did not ratify the treaty on the limitation of strategic weapons -- because of resistance from the American military-industrial complex. This complex profits from the production of arms and the American political elite, who dream of U.S. military superiority to establish peace in the American way. Because of this, Washington has all these years taken a course for accumulating arms, first and foremost nuclear arms.

In its stand against this, the USSR has and continues to come out in favor of the complete end to nuclear tests; not only does it do this but it acts as an example in practice, having already extended the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions three times. I will point out that recently, particularly after the accident at the Chernobyl AES the demand to ban nuclear tests has sounded particularly loudly in the world. However, on the American site in Nevada nuclear explosions continue to thunder. In the last few days, literally on the eve of the anniversary of the Moscow Treaty, General Scowcroft, head of the special presidential commission on strategic forces has once again publicly come out in favor of the continuation of nuclear tests.

This is a dangerous and adventurist policy. Nuclear war cannot be a continuation of a rational policy, for it brings an end to life as a whole and for that reason to all policies. Today's anniversary of the treaty for the limitation of nuclear tests should also be a reminder of this.

### Total Ban Urged

LD032012 Moscow TASS in English 1945 GMT 3 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 3 TASS -- By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev

Twelve years ago today, on July 3, 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States signed a treaty limiting underground nuclear weapons testing. Banning the tests of nuclear explosive devices with yields of more than 150 kilotons, it has constituted an important step towards the overriding goal of putting a general and complete end to nuclear weapons testing.

Regrettably, after the Reagan administration took over in the United States Washington has refused to ratify both the 1974 treaty and the 1976 agreement on nuclear blasts for peaceful purposes. The U.S. Administration has frustrated tripartite talks on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear testing.

Washington has continued to this day to respond to the Soviet Union's proposals for a resumption of the talks and to the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions with further tests in Nevada.

The U.S. Administration has to lean over backwards to somehow justify its obstructionist stand on a comprehensive nuclear test ban before the world.

Three members of the presidential commission on strategic forces, including its chairman, General Brent Scowcroft, recently came out against the ban in a WASHINGTON POST article. They cited a number of old arguments against the ban, swathing them in a pseudo-scientific, confused language. They claimed, for example, that an end to tests would erode U.S. confidence in its nuclear armories and for this reason a corresponding agreement would be disadvantageous to the United States.

It is utterly clear, however, that the nuclear arsenals of the USSR will likewise lose their reliability as a result of the test ban. The Soviet Union considers the loss of reliability of nuclear munitions on both sides a positive factor because in this case even in the Pentagon there will hardly be found any advocates for using untested and thus unreliable weapons of enormous power and unpredictable effects in a first strike.

The ban will thus reduce the probability of a nuclear war.

To lend credibility to their conclusions, the authors of THE WASHINGTON POST article even reproached President Reagan for some of his more odious positions on the problems of war and peace. But their final conclusion wholly stems from the overall militarist strategy of the White House. Neither talks on a complete end to nuclear explosions nor a moratorium on nuclear testing or even talks on the issue suit the Reagan administration.

Scowcroft and his aides babbled out the true aims of the U.S. Administration. It is only a situation where the West will be strong and the Russians will gradually agree to U.S. military superiority that suits it.

Washington's reaction to Soviet proposals for an end to nuclear testing has shown that the Reagan administration is still under the dominion of groundless, illusory hopes for nuclear-missile superiority and that in its foreign policy it continues to be guided by great-power chauvinism and "neoglobalism".

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET PHYSICIST: ALL UNDERGROUND TESTS LEAK RADIATION

LD010805 Moscow TASS in English 0723 GMT 1 Jul 86

[Text] Leningrad, 1 Jul (TASS)--Underground nuclear explosions continued by the U.S. were called an "evidence of appalling cynicism" by the well-known Soviet physicist, Yevgeniy Komarov.

"A year will pass soon since the Soviet Union has announced and is observing unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions," Yevgeniy Komarov, a vice-director of Leningrad's Rhoentgen and Radiological Research Institute, told a TASS correspondent. "At the same time the U.S. obsessively pushes forward with its tests, thus challenging mankind."

"As a specialist I know that nuclear tests, no matter how deep underground they are held, always involve a leak of radiation into ground waters and the atmosphere," Professor Komarov continued. "Such facts were registered at the Nevada test range. Soviet physicians, members of 'The Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War' movement, strongly protest against the insanity of the U.S. military and political circles that jeopardize the life and health of the people in their country and whole regions elsewhere," Professor Komarov concluded.

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CSO: 5200/1462

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### MOSCOW CITES U.S. EXPERT ON TEST BAN VERIFICATION

LD091248 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 8 Jul 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Thomas Cochran, who was leading a group of seismological experts from the New York based National Resources Defense Council, has told a news conference in Moscow that the group came to the Soviet Union to demonstrate that verification is no obstacle to a nuclear test ban, and that the United States and Soviet Union can cooperate in this objective.

According to Cochran current international monitoring is adequate to verify any comprehensive test ban that might be agreed on. Any test carried out and not detected, the New York expert said, would be so small as to be of no military significance.

This opinion is (?now dominant). The possibility of reliable control has become obvious. Every nuclear explosion in Nevada, just as any nuclear explosion anywhere, was immediately registered in the Soviet Union, Sweden and other countries. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is ready to agree to practically any measures in addition to existing measures so as to ensure reliable observance of a total test ban.

For nearly a year now, since the 6th of August last year, the Soviet Union has honored a unilateral suspension of all nuclear explosions, both peaceful and military. Moscow urges Washington to follow suit. A joint action of this kind would be a landmark in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and would help to rid humanity of the threat of nuclear war. If Washington were to agree to a mutual test ban with the Soviet Union, the ban would have the strictest verification. A verification system would include both existing seismic stations, of which there are more than 200 in the United States alone, and new, specially established facilities. Use could be made of the services offered by six countries of various continents: India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece and Sweden. On-site inspection, suggested by the Soviet Union, could also be used. In short, verification is no problem.

The Soviet Union is ready to agree to the verification of any agreement, whether it be a complete ban on nuclear explosions, or an agreement for the reduction of nuclear weapons and their total elimination. This willingness is a practical expression of the Soviet belief that the nuclear age requires new thinking. Everything must be done to save the nations from a holocaust. But unfortunately there is still nothing new to verify. The Soviet Union and the United States have not signed a single arms control agreement since the present American Administration took over the reins of government. More than that, Washington is openly refusing to observe agreements signed earlier. These actions of the administration are so obvious that no verification is needed.

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: SOVIET PROPOSALS MAKE U.S. 'CONSTANT NO' MORE DIFFICULT

LD061826 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 6 Jul 86

["International Observers Round Table" program, with Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, deputy director of the United States and Canada Institute and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Political Observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; and All-Union Radio commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin]

[Excerpts] [Levin] The socialist countries have put forward a whole number of very specific proposals which could radically change the international political climate for the better. We have already mentioned the decisions by the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee which spoke of a considerable reduction in armed forces and weapons on the European Continent. Specifically, the socialist countries are proposing that armed forces and weapons be reduced by approximately 25 percent before the start of the 1990's -- in other words in the very shortest period of time. If you bear in mind that military alliances with 3 million men are confronting each other in Europe now, then it is a very significant and very weighty proposal. It is also a vital need for the European Continent, for it is really oversaturated with arms of various kinds, and the socialist countries are proposing a radical solution for all the problems. We have long been raising the issue of a withdrawal of all nuclear missile systems from Europe. To this end, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have again submitted extremely far-reaching proposals, proposals which to a large degree take into account the position of the Western powers. When we had only just started to speak about completely freeing Europe of nuclear weapons, we were reproached for, as they said, leaving aside conventional weapons, of which there are a very great many, and so on and so forth. Indeed, there are a great many of them, and so we are now organically complementing our proposals for completely scrapping nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and freeing Europe of nuclear weapons with proposals for the limitation and substantial reduction of conventional weapons. One should not fail to add to this also that the Soviet Union not only declares its will for peace: We show it in action, too. We put a moratorium on the conducting of nuclear explosions, and that moratorium -- a unilateral one -- will in practice operate for 1 year. The United States categorically refuses to join us and is thus wrecking the possibility of its being extended, although the possibilities are there. We suggest that talks be started without delay on a treaty completely banning nuclear weapons. We are not stationing new nuclear missile systems on the European Continent -- something else that should be pointed out. But what we come across here is an essentially obstructionist attitude by the United States. We put forward a tremendous number of constructive and businesslike proposals, proposals, incidentally, that arouse great interest in Western Europe; but the United States replies to everything with essentially one word: No.

[Zhurkin] Viktor Nikolayevich, you mentioned that I think is one very important feature of this series of exceptionally large-scale Soviet initiatives -- one to which I think is worth drawing further attention. That is the fact that the Soviet proposals, this system of Soviet proposals, is built on an extremely careful consideration of the proposals that have come from the other side, proposals that have come not only from the public, not only from the peace-loving forces, and not only from those people who want a constructive development of relations, but also from official circles, including the United States. Take for example, when the first proposals for preventing an arms race in space and for reducing nuclear weapons were submitted. The first thing that the Americans replied was that it is not clear how the question of monitoring will stand. And so in-depth and extremely sound proposals were put forward for various forms of monitoring including, among other things, on-site inspection. Take when, as you said, the initiative was raised concerning nuclear disarmament. They replied: But what about conventional weapons?, and said that war could also break out because of the large number of conventional weapons stockpiled.

The initiative set out in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 on nuclear disarmament was then immediately backed up with proposals in the sphere of conventional weapons. I think that this feature, which has, incidentally, been noted by many people in the West too, is evidence not only of the realistic nature of our proposals, but also of our ardent and sincere desire to reach agreement and meet other people halfway. And unfortunately, you are right, of course, in that from the opposite side, from the other side of the negotiations table, there is no positive reaction of this kind.

[Shishlin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, I don't know whether you will agree or not, but I have the feeling that, all the same, these 6 months of 1986, marked by the broad and bold initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, have not been fruitless. It is true, of course, that arms have not been reduced by a single unit, but have probably increased, taking account of the fact that the United States, as before, is putting into practice all its plans, and all its military programs, and is implementing them. But even so, these months, as I say, have not been fruitless; there has been a buildup of very important political capital, and in these conditions I have the impression that here, in mid-1986, the United States is finding it more and more difficult to repeat its constant no in answer to the Soviet proposals.

In any case, in the past weeks, at least as far as the tone of some speeches by figures in the U.S. Administration, including the President of the United States, is concerned, some new motifs are evidently beginning to resound. And I think that this very potential which has been amassed, and is being accumulated, of course also includes the idea outlined in the speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the 10th PZPR Congress. I hope our radio listeners paid attention to the place in the speech by the general secretary of the Central Committee where it is said that Soviet troops are not permanently based in Europe. That is a very important idea, a very significant idea. In fact, it develops the practical proposal on reducing arms and armed forces in that extensive area from the Atlantic to the Urals. That is why I think that, of course, the situation remains both complicated and difficult -- but, it seems to me, it does not look like a dead end.

[Zhurkin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, I agree with you. It must be said that, after all, the influence of the Soviet initiatives develops in more than one dimension, not only on the official level. Let us take the level of the general public. It is often said that the public in the West holds meetings, makes speeches, holds demonstrations. But what does that produce in reality? The governments continue to act as before. I think it would

be incorrect to assess the situation in that way. Of course, there are no hard and fast criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of shifts in public mood, but they do manifest themselves. I will give you one fairly elementary example: A year to 18 months ago there was a shift in U.S. public opinion toward the view that U.S. military expenditure should not be increased any more. These expressions of public feeling put pressure on Congress, and last year -- not long before the Geneva meeting -- for various reasons, above all because of the absolutely appalling budgetary deficit of the United States, of course, but also to a great extent because of public pressure, Congress cut the military allocations of the Reagan administration. In fact, if you assess it in real terms, that is, making adjustments for inflation, the military budget of the United States is equal this year to the 1985 budget. The ascending line has been broken for 1 year. Now a struggle is in progress in Congress to break this curve for 1987, and in general things are apparently moving toward the point where, to a significant extent, this will be achieved, too. If one recalls the old plan of the Reagan administration, which was published in 1982, it was planned that \$400 billion would be spent in 1987. Now Reagan has asked for \$320 billion, to start with, Congress cut it to less than \$300 billion. Now this is already something real. It is the real influence of the public through a legislative body -- a body which is unique, which adopts a mass of negative decisions, too, but nevertheless, let us say that in one area, something is being accomplished.

[Shishlin] I want to pick up on that thought, because it really is correct. One can measure the outcome of our initiatives here in various directions, and the outcome of the turnarounds which are going on in the frame of mind of public and political circles. Take, for example, Europe. How does Western Europe look, how does the reaction of the West Europeans to the Soviet proposals look? Well, let us recall, for example, the meeting of foreign ministers of the NATO member-countries last month, in Halifax. At that time, when the United States had in fact declared that it would reject its obligations under the SALT II treaty, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz turned out to be on his own at that meeting of NATO foreign ministers. All the NATO countries came out against that decision, against the U.S. rejection of the SALT II treaty. And that is a direct echo of the political moods which are developing in West European countries. And while at governmental level, for example, both West German officials and the British Conservatives are following the line of U.S. policy, it is, firstly, becoming a little more difficult for them to do this than before. And secondly, if we look a shade deeper, we discover that the opposition political forces, which are acquiring increasingly perceptible weight in the life of these countries, these political forces, let us say the Social Democrats in West Germany...

[Zhurkin interrupts] The Labor Party in Britain.

[Shishlin] The Labor Party in Britain -- they are starting to take up antinuclear positions, on the key, most acute question of the limitation and curbing of the arms race.

[Levin] In connection with this, people often say in the United States -- in connection with our initiatives, and our appeal to Western Europe for it to act more vigorously -- that our intention is to drive a wedge into NATO. But of course it is not like that at all. And in that same speech which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev read at the 10th PZPR Congress, where an appeal was made for the West Europeans to more actively influence the solution of international problems, it was not by accident that the point was noted that at one time the United States played a positive role, too, in European affairs, during the work of the all-European Conference on Security and Cooperation. And we would only welcome it if the United States now, as well, played the same positive role. But if they do not play it, then a question naturally arises: The Europeans must



think about themselves and look after themselves first and foremost, because these problems must be solved urgently. This is a very important question, and in this connection I think one can voice certain, I should say, bright prospects -- although it would be premature to rush at this point -- in connection with the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union by President Mitterrand of France. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev visited France last year. That became a notable event, not only in the life of our two countries, but also in the life of the whole of Europe, and one can assert with complete confidence that Mitterrand's visit to the USSR will also become an event of general European significance.

Now, before this visit, a statement was made by an official representative of the Elysee Palace, who said France attaches great significance to contacts with the Soviet Union, and to the forthcoming visit to the USSR by President Francois Mitterrand.

Mitterrand himself, as you obviously already know, was in the United States on 4 July in connection with the centenary celebration of the Statue of Liberty and the national holiday of the United States. Before his trip to the United States, he gave an interview to THE WASHINGTON POST. And in that interview he said, in particular, that in America people are not happy with France's position regarding Libya. You remember the story, when France banned U.S. planes from flying over its territory on their way to bomb Libya. And on that score Mitterrand answered very precisely: If the United States considers that it can have good relations only with those countries which agree with all its wishes, then they will no longer be relations based on alliance and friendship, but relations based on domination.

And at that point Mitterrand talked very insistently about the need for observance of the SALT II treaty. In connection with that he expressed one thought which seems highly interesting to me, and deserves attention: If we, the president of France said, are approaching a period of disarmament, France will not act in a way which will complicate the situation by announcing the development of new weapons.

[Shishlin] France bears its share of responsibility for the fact that the problems of limiting and curtailing the arms race are still not being solved. But this, of course, does not put in doubt the value and usefulness of the Soviet-French dialogue and equally the intensive political contacts that are being effected at present by both the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with their West European neighbors. Europe can definitely play a separate and independent role in improving not only European relations but also international affairs as such.

[Zhurkin] That is certainly so. Moreover, naturally, this independent role -- or it would be more correct to say, unnaturally -- this independent role on the part of Western Europe is very much disliked by the United States. Incidentally, if indeed someone is driving a wedge into relations between Western Europe and the United States, it is being done very successfully by Washington, which conducts itself in a high-handed way toward Western Europe and simply ignores the feelings of the West Europeans. Just recall how it tried to foist SDI on the West Europeans and how it is now attempting to impose on them the U.S. decision to renounce compliance with the SALT II treaty. At times it seems simply incredible that toward the end of the 20th century, Western Europe, which is certainly one of the cradles of world culture and civilization, is being subjected to such high-handed treatment. But it is a fact, and it is also one of the characteristic features of U.S. policy and one of the realities of our times -- a reality which, I am sure, will sooner or later rebound on the United States and will do so fairly painfully.



[Levin] Yes, if it does not make the appropriate adjustments, which are being dictated by life itself. Because at the present time the issue of halting the arms race and the issue of limiting armaments are presenting themselves most acutely. Mankind is pondering over where we are heading, and is reaching conclusions which uniformly testify to the fact that the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear conflict is fraught with deadly peril. In these conditions, however, the United States has found nothing better than through certain staff members of the Livermore atomic laboratory to begin to spread claims that the rumors of the possibility of a nuclear winter have been greatly exaggerated and claiming that it will not be so terrible and that it will be possible to survive nuclear war. This is a cannibalistic philosophy, and one categorically cannot agree with such a philosophy.

[Zhurkin] It is a very dangerous philosophy too, because a government which attempts to conceal from its own people the truth of the absolutely tragic consequences of nuclear war can be suspected of preparing for such a war, if it conceals the truth from the people.

[Levin] There is a reason for this. At times, representatives of the U.S. Administration have recourse to very dubious jokes when they wish to justify their position. When he was speaking a few days ago, President Reagan said -- but here I should first explain some points. In English, the abbreviation used for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty is SALT. This sounds the same as the word salt. Now, Reagan, making a pun about this, said that too much salt is harmful to one's health. However, SALT II is a treaty that is vitally essential for people. Not only is it not harmful, it is very useful for the health of the whole of mankind. This sounds funny, as it were, but very serious things indeed are concealed behind this.

[Zhurkin] Of course there are very contradictory factors and trends at work. Obviously amid all these contradictions one needs clearly to see the U.S. position. There certainly is a set of extremely negative trends, but at the same time there is pressure from both at home and abroad for this course to be changed and for the sharpness of the course to be somewhat blunted. It seems to me that not to notice this influence and not to notice these factors would also be wrong.

[Shishlin] It seems to me that the second half of 1986 contains many good opportunities for intensifying the East-West dialogue, precisely in order to solve key problems concerning international security. In this respect, one must not forget that the Soviet Union is keeping the doors open for talks, not only with the French president and not only with the West Europeans, but also for talks with the Americans -- serious, business-like, and responsible talks. The Soviet proposals in fact lie on the negotiating table, and the Soviet Union is indeed ready in the most responsible way to approach the holding of a new Soviet-American summit meeting. If the United States is ready to reciprocate and really follows the Soviet example with regard to the political goodwill which has so clearly been demonstrated throughout the first half of 1986, it seems to me that from their present over-cool state Soviet-American relations could be brought to a somewhat different and warmer state -- a state that would be more productive of results and more fruitful than at present.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW ON 'SINCERITY' OF U.S., SOVIET PROPOSALS

LD071335 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 6 Jul 86

[Panel discussions from the weekly "Top Priority" program presented by Moscow radio commentator Vladimir Posner, with "Professors" Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov -- recorded]

[Excerpts] [Posner] This is Vladimir Posner presenting "Top Priority." On the panel with me are Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov. I would like to explore today with you an issue that has been brought up by one of our listeners, Robert Grant, who makes his home in Riverdale, New York, and it concerns the sincerity and the authenticity of Soviet peace proposals. What Mr. Grant expresses -- and this is a feeling that I've encountered in the United States; it is not shared by all Americans but certainly there are some who share it -- what he expresses is a doubt concerning the true aims of the Soviet Union. He says, on one hand, we talk about disarmament, about arms limitation; on the other hand, he talks about the huge Soviet military build-up, which he calls dramatic. He seems to feel that while we talk peace our intentions are not peaceful at all. Now what would you say to that particular view Dr Bogdanov?

[Bogdanov] I believe that our listener touches upon a very interesting and very important problem in the Soviet-American relations because both sides from time to time produce very important arms control proposals and both sides claim that their proposal are just and sincere, aiming at a peaceful, you know, solution of the problem. And of course both sides have their own doubts about that, and what he says about our proposals I can say about American proposals too -- that we don't see any sincere aims in American proposals. We just see one aim, to get superiority over the Soviet Union. And I am afraid, dear Vladimir, that if I produce 1,000 arguments trying to convince our listener that, no our proposals are really peaceful, sincere, he is not disposed to believe us because he belongs mentally you know, psychologically, he belongs over the other side of the river, if you like. And I respect his views; I respect his views. If I were living in America, today's America, under such a heavy pressure information, or misinformation pressure about the aims of the Soviet Union maybe I would put the same arguments; I would put the same doubts about the Soviet proposals.

My question to my listener over there: How can a country of such huge amount of losses, almost destroyed, literally speaking destroyed after the Second World War, aim at aggression against the world. How it is possible? Just tell me? Where is the logic? So what am I to tell our listener over there just to be more fair, more impartial, try to look at the problem not from the propaganda point of view but from larger perspective, historical, even historical perspective. Maybe that's where he will find out an answer to that very very, I agree, very complex and very delicate problem.

[Posner] Dr Plekhanov would you care to add to this argument? As I understand it, Professor Bogdanov is saying that, on the one hand, the Soviet Union is a country that has suffered from war as none other, and therefore it would be illogical to imagine that the Soviet Union would have any other desire but that of a war-free world, and that that's what our proposals are basically aimed at. Would you care to enlarge on the subject, or do you have another approach?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I would like to respond to this notion that there has been a huge Soviet military build-up which has put America in a situation of great danger. That notion has been around for so long that one is surprised that, in the face of all the information that is available to American citizens, they still continue to believe it. Maybe that's because they don't really care to study the facts. But by and large the picture boils down to this very simple fact, neither side can hope to fight and win a war against the other side.

That's the deadlock which has been produced by the decades of a nuclear arms race, and it's very dangerous, in the first place, to ascribe to the Soviet Union a desire to overtake the West and to try to obtain a capability to fight a war against the West because simply a dangerous solution that anybody can hope to fight and win a war under these conditions. Therefore, our proposals for disarmament are based on the realization of this very important fact, that there is only one way out of this deadlock and that is reducing and eliminating totally nuclear weapons, reducing the numbers of conventional weapons, reducing the level of enmity and distrust between the two sides.

[Posner] I think that we should point to the fact that the way that the Soviet Union has attained parity, rough parity with the United States, is within the framework, the agreed upon framework of the SALT I and the SALT II agreements. That is to say that those agreements foresaw that this parity be achieved.

[Bogdanov] Even the worst enemies of SALT I and SALT II agreements do not dare to say that we have overcome the limits of the agreements; we are within the limits of SALT I and SALT II agreements.

[Plekhanov] By the way we have had to dismantle quite a lot of our strategic weapons systems in order to stay within the limits of those of those agreements.

[Posner] I think Dr Bogdanov made a very, very important point when you spoke about the fact that it is very difficult to prove to someone who does not want to believe that our aims, our goals, are indeed honest and sincere, and that we're not kind of playing a double game. However, I would like to ask you to cudgel your brains, as it were, and perhaps come up with some kind of Soviet concrete activities rather than proposals that would leave no doubt as to the intentions of the Soviet Union. Have there been, any such concrete acts, deeds, that would reflect the Soviet Union's sincere desire to attain agreement not only in the field of arms limitation, but ultimately in the field of arms reduction?

[Bogdanov] Well, first of all I would mention the moratorium. You know that's the most concrete, most concrete you know gesture of the Soviet Union to signal to our American counterparts that we are very much willing to stop the arms race.

[Posner] I think you should perhaps dwell on this in a little bit of detail because I'm not sure that Mr Grant, or perhaps some other people, are fully aware of the history of this moratorium, what it is.

[Bogdanov] By the way, no American official, or no American center ever claimed that we have violated our moratorium claim. And we have, you know, some other examples of a very sincere approach to that, not only to that but to some other arms control problems. For instance, verification problems which were a stumbling block for so many years on the road to solve all these problems. Now we are open for any kind of verification, including on-spot inspection, as many as required, in such places which are needed to be verified and things like that, and things like that. Now, Vladimir, to end with that. Let me give some kind of a food for reflection for our listener over there. The Soviet Union has been accused of aggressive designs for so many years but does our listener over there know that for the last 60 years Soviet Union was twice attacked from the West, and not once was the West attacked from the Soviet Union. Doesn't it prove enough that we have no aggressive design? And if we have our own fears and doubts about the West, it's just because we were a target for devastating wars and attacks from the West.

[Posner] Getting back to the point you made about it being almost impossible to prove that the Soviet Union's proposals are indeed sincere ones, I have often thought that instead of calling them propaganda, as they often have been called by different representatives of the U.S. Administration, one way to test the sincerity of the Soviet Union would be to call its bluff, as they say in poker, that is to say, to agree to a Soviet proposal and then see if indeed the Soviet Union adheres to it. If it does not, then that would certainly furnish grounds to say that the Soviet Union was not sincere. However, this has not been done, and I have always had a suspicion that the people who could call the Soviet Union's bluff do not because they -- as differing from Mr Grant -- know only too well that indeed the Soviet Union is very much ready to do what it proposes. Now how do you feel about that argument, Dr Plekhanov?

[Plekhanov] I think that's been the story of the arms race and the attempts to curb it ever since the Second World War, because there have been so many good proposals, equitable proposals, coming from the Soviet Union, starting with the very early years of the nuclear arms race, like the total nuclear disarmament proposals of 1946 and many others. They were all put forward when the Soviet Union was...we started to put them forward when we were much weaker than we are now, when we were way back in terms of the numbers of nuclear weapons, nuclear bombers and so on and so forth, and we kept putting them forward when we achieved parity. And so, you see, the attitudes were always, on the American side, were always negative, very cautious and so on because the United States lived with military superiority for several decades and there's a whole political culture around Washington among the policy makers which is based on this notion that having a superiority, being number one is a good thing for a country like the United States in world affairs. One of the troubling things in the recent years in America has been a surfacing of that argument. Parity has been somewhat put under doubt. A viewpoint which was held by a fringe on the far right of American politics has now gained greater credence in Washington. You know, more and more politicians are openly asking why not be number one? Why not be number one? And one of the arguments in favor of that is the line that the Soviet Union is so bad it cannot be really awarded an equality in the sphere of arms while the United States is so good, that when it does have an edge, no one should fear that because United States is so inherently good.

[Posner] Well, winding up now when time is just about up, I'd like to ask Dr Bogdanov whether or not you believe that the honesty and the integrity of the Soviet proposals will indeed get through to the United States, to the American people and can we at all be optimistic in hoping that this will happen?

[Bogdanov] Yes, there is only one way out for that. Let them try. Let them try how sincere we are. I believe that it wouldn't be bad if our listener over there -- we had very interesting discussion with him -- would continue that discussion with us and if he is interested in some more problems of that very major importance, we will be very glad to answer and to discuss with him.

[Posner] Well, Mr Grant, the invitation is there. We are hoping to get a letter from you.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET ANALYST HITS U.S. RESPONSES TO ARMS INITIATIVES

PMO41101 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jun 86 p 9

[M. Maksimov article under the rubric "The Main Topic": "What Is MAD?"]

[Text] This abbreviation is now being used more frequently in politicians' speeches and commentators' articles in the West: "MAD is an acknowledgment of the realities of our day," "MAD ensure peace on the planet," "MAD is what everyone needs"... So what is MAD? MAD means "mutually assured destruction." It seems that we are all provided with enough of that, even some to spare. True, for some people that surplus is plainly insufficient, they want to add to it. But why? In order to be assured of destruction many times over? In any case, they are trying to make policy out of the condition in which mankind finds itself (and MAD is a sign of that condition).

Washington has yet to give a clear response to the new Soviet initiatives set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's report at the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum, or to the proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact members in Budapest. Let us not anticipate events, but we will observe that THE NEW YORK TIMES' assertions that the White House is "seriously studying" the recent proposals in the arms control sphere allow us to suppose that perhaps this time something will change in the position of the administration, where elements of the MAD policy still prevail.

What is the basis for this optimistic assumption? Above all, it is based on the nature of the Soviet initiatives themselves, which make it possible to seek new approaches and clear the way for nuclear arms reduction. These initiatives undoubtedly facilitate the quest for mutually advantageous accords at the Geneva talks.

How has the United States responded so far to previous Soviet proposals: on the nuclear test moratorium with on-site verification, on a sharp reduction in Euromissiles and new efforts in the strategic arms control sphere? With an intensification of what are bashfully called "regional conflicts" with an increase in aid to the "contras," who are being defeated in Nicaragua; with deliveries of portable Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the Afghan dushman and the UNITA bandits in Angola; and finally, with the piratical raid on Libya.

All the same, in the opinion of the French magazine LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, since the Geneva meeting President Reagan can no longer simply shrug off the Soviet initiatives. He has even been forced to admit that they are not without interest, although, on the other hand, he does not want to give up the idea of trying to stifle the Soviet economy by dragging it into a destructive race to create a "space shield."

Let us observe that since 1945 nuclear weapons have never once been used for military purposes. Do people say that this is the result of the fear of MAD? To some extent. But the crux of the matter is that militarism is beginning to find roundabout ways, and these lie in the creation of new weapons (for instance, laser weapons) that would not be inferior to nuclear weapons in terms of destructive properties. They add nonnuclear "deterrence" to nuclear, with, for instance, the "Rogers Plan," which makes provision for a "second echelon" strike against the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries.

What was proposed in Budapest? A substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, a gradual reduction, according to an agreed timetable and with constant preservation of the military equilibrium at lower levels without detriment to anyone's security. In other words, if you had four "nuclear stones," now you would then keep three -- it will make it easier to walk!

But the whole point is that some people in Washington would like to get hold of even more stones. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR newspaper observes in this connection: "The most important question is whether President Reagan will have the determination to cut short the quarreling in the administration and make his officials apply every effort to achieve an agreement." The newspaper believes that the disputes and distortions over the departure from SALT II and the inability to set forth a consistent U.S. policy are explained by the strengthening of the positions of those who support a so-called hard line since the Geneva meeting. It tries to create the impression that certain forces alongside the White House, rather than its chief himself, are to blame for everything. Well, we shall see. In any event, as M.S. Gorbachev stated, if the American side ignores our initiatives again this time, it will be obvious that the present U.S. Administration is playing an unseemly game on a very serious matter on which mankind's future depends.

P.S. President Reagan delivered a speech on arms control in Glassboro (New Jersey). Alas, it was only high-flown words about American peaceability and less high-flown words about the "communists' machinations," and the President said that "talk alone is not enough" and it is time to "take action for the sake of peace." Indeed it is time!

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31 July 1986

## RELATED ISSUES

## PRAVDA SURVEYS 1986 SOVIET PROPOSALS, U.S. RESPONSES

PM081235 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[Igor Melnikov: "International Review"]

[Excerpts] Fewer Weapons, Greater Security

Let me list the most important foreign policy steps taken by our country during the first half of 1986 alone -- in the year which has been declared the Year of Peace by the United Nations.

In January it put forward a program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. At the 27th CPSU Congress the idea of creating a comprehensive system of international security was advanced. This was followed by specific proposals which represent a key to an agreement on the removal of medium-range missiles from Europe. A quest was launched for special accords with the West European nuclear powers -- Britain and France. Measures to eliminate the chemical threat were submitted. In May we extended for the third time the moratorium on nuclear tests which now spans a whole year. And finally, in June, together with the other Warsaw Pact countries, the USSR put forward a detailed plan for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms throughout the continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This shows how many rows of bricks our country has laid in the edifice of security and disarmament. Its actions are the translation into reality of the very logic of the present time -- fewer weapons, greater security.

However, no edifice can consist of just one wall, of course, no matter how thick that wall is. So how is the work progressing on the other, the Western side? Well, it appears that on that side of the building of secure peace, the sledgehammer rather than the trowel is being used and that everything that was built and cemented during the years of detente is persistently being wrecked. And what is even more incredible is that, while swinging the sledgehammer for all it is worth, Washington continues to hold forth about its desire for disarmament. This leads to a strange "work" rhythm: bombastic assurances about the love of peace are made with one breath, while with the next breath another step is taken toward dismantling the disarmament agreements.

I will recount one of the sequences of this rhythm. Speaking in Glassboro recently, President Reagan admitted, albeit not without reservations, the importance of the new proposals for nuclear arms reductions put forward by the USSR. Now, he declared, a turning point may have been reached in the efforts aimed at strengthening security and peace everywhere.



But where are the actions to bear out his words? Well, there is the "American-style" deadlock at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms, where the U.S. delegation has evaded discussion of the Soviet side's proposals even on its favorite topic of verification [kontrol]. There is also C. Weinberger's 1 July press conference, at which he said literally the following: "I am pleased to tell you today that, within the framework of our research, the FLAG weapons system destroyed a target last Friday which was moving at three times the speed of sound.... Obviously, we are very pleased."

Well, these are the winding ways which lead to "star wars"! And no matter how pleased the Pentagon chief is, his sober-minded compatriots are only too well aware that another "black Friday" has been entered on the U.S. calendar with the help of the FLAG system.

Attempts are made to drown the voices of reason heard increasingly loudly in the United States. And the cacophony of militarist trumpets is once again considered the most suitable means. Washington, the London FINANCIAL TIMES writes sarcastically, is spinning saga about an impenetrable space shield which is supposed to provide protection against nuclear arms. The Pentagon's Richard Perle claims that any U.S. senator who refuses to vote for equipping B-52 bombers with air-launched cruise missiles will be siding with the Russians. And so on and so forth.

Who Needs "The Rape of Europa?"

However, it is not just Washington that fails to display a serious approach to the problem of war and consequently to the problem of mankind's survival. The governments of a number of other NATO states are also suffering from this failing. Including states which verbally dissociate themselves from the Pentagon's dangerous twists and turns but which ultimately give way to pressure from across the ocean and therefore must accept a considerable share of the responsibility for the intensification of the arms race.

And sometimes it seems that certain West European politicians are prepared to "touch up" the well-known painting "The Rape of Europa" by adding brushstrokes, judging by the ease with which they sell out to the United States the national interests of their countries and the fate of the continent's 700 million-strong population.

And here is an interesting detail: In interviewing British Foreign Secretary G. Howe, the right-wing West German newspaper DIE WELT did not spare M. Thatcher's pride. The correspondent remarked that the British opposition had recently leveled sharp criticism at the government for its excessive obedience in toeing Washington's line. The foreign secretary paid the impertinent journalist back by noting that London's view of the U.S. role in NATO and Europe virtually did not differ from Bonn's viewpoint.

This idea is corroborated by a recent article published in the Hamburg magazine DER SPIEGEL. To begin with, the magazine cites a remark by the FRG Chancellor: In politics it is just as in a family -- when people truly understand each other, it is easier for them to meet each other halfway. But the question is: Are these "pure feelings" mutual? Judging by what DER SPIEGEL has to say, there is no question of their being mutual. Throughout his period in office, Chancellor H. Kohl has overrated the "family" feelings of the White House incumbent, the magazine writes. In a situation which consists of a mixture of sham harmony and readiness to accommodate the other side, the sharp contours of policy have become blunted.

So what is the upshot? The journal sums it up as follows: If Kohl's party continues to follow U.S. recipes for strength and the arms race, it will have ignored the hopes of its own conservative voters, most of whom -- as polls carried out by the Christian Democratic Union headquarters in Bonn indicate -- favor peace and normal relations with the East.

In the past, the United States joined in the all-European process and put its signature to the Helsinki Final Act. The socialist countries welcomed these steps. Now, as experience shows, the U.S. Administration is tending in the opposite direction. But it is as clear as day that the interests of the peoples and states of Western Europe by no means lie in that "opposite" direction.

So what, you may ask, is stopping the governments of the West European NATO countries from taking seriously the Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range nuclear missile weapons and the reduction of conventional arms? After all, in putting forward these initiatives, our country is not trying to drive a wedge between and the United States and the NATO allies. In submitting its proposals, the Soviet Union proceeds from the existing political and military realities on the continent.

It is to be hoped that the positive idea aimed at a substantial relaxation of tension on the continent will prevail. As for the socialist countries, they consider it their duty to build bridges for cooperation wherever this is possible -- in sport, cultural exchanges, trade, scientific and technical cooperation, production sharing, and contacts between people. Everything that unites Europe, regardless of the differences in states' social systems, can be strengthened through positive, genuine cooperation. In this way, and only in this way, will the peoples of our continent be able to prevent the "outrage of the century" -- the rape of the independent policy of certain West European states.

So even now, in the course of the reprisals against the demonstrators 7 people were killed, 50 injured, and more than 1,000 Chileans, including 17 leaders of opposition parties and organizations, were arrested by secret police agents.

The buildup of antidictatorship actions in the country is being promoted by a broad international campaign aimed at isolating the Pinochet dictatorship. The UN General Assembly, the IPU, and many other organizations have voiced their protests. U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy has just denounced the terror unleashed against the participants in the general strike. The savage reprisals are criminal, and there is no justification for them, he declared.

The eruption of the Chilean volcano is intensifying. And the incandescent lava of the people's anger is flowing toward the dictator and his henchmen. There is no doubt that the criminals whose hands are stained with the blood of the Chilean people will soon be removed.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS HITS WEST FOR DELAY ON UN DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT PARLEY

LD211835 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 21 Jun 86

[Text] New York, 21 Jun (TASS)--TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reports:

The 40th session of the United Nations General Assembly resumed its work for one day on 20 June in order to discuss questions connected with an international conference on relationship between disarmament and development, as well as a number of problems of development and international economic cooperation.

It has been decided to put off till 1987 the holding of the international conference on relationship between disarmament and development. Under a decision of the General Assembly it was to be held in July-August of this year in Paris. But a number of Western powers headed by the United States, embarked from the start on the road of obstruction and prevented the holding of that important forum on the fixed schedule. They actually tried to bury the very idea of convening the conference on the question vital for humanity, pressing for it to be put off "indefinitely".

But these attempts have failed. The concrete deadline and venue of the conference will be determined at the next, 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The discussion of interconnected financial problems, indebtedness of states, questions of trade and development made it possible to understand better how dangerous it is to tolerate the inequitable nature of the existing international commercial and financial system, said representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic V. Skofenko, who spoke on behalf of the delegations of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Czechoslovakia. Socialist countries firmly declare for removing from international practice all forms of discrimination, the policy of boycott and sanctions, creation of international barriers in the sphere of scientific and technological exchanges. They strongly support the demands of developing countries in the United Nations for the normalization of international economic relations.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS REPORTS ON UN EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL SECURITY

LD280756 Moscow TASS in English 0038 GMT 28 Jun 86

[Text] Vienna, 28 Jun (TASS)--The UN European regional conference "Questions of Global Security in the 1980s", has ended here.

The conference was attended by representatives of non-governmental institutions, organizations and movements, peace and disarmament scientific research centers from Europe, North America and countries of other continents.

In the course of the discussion of topical problems of consolidation of international security and the UN role in promoting this goal, the attention of the participants was focused on the need of involving still broader public circles into the struggle for consolidation of peace and disarmament.

Participants in the conference pointed to the great significance of the Soviet peace initiatives aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the significance of the Soviet Union's prolongation of its moratorium on nuclear explosions, and also the program of reduction of troops and conventional armaments in Europe, which was put forward by the Warsaw Treaty member states at the Budapest meeting.

Participants in the conference stressed the need of enhancing the role of the United Nations and other international organizations and institutions in the efforts to strengthen international peace and security on the basis of the aims and principles of the UN charter.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS: UN COMMITTEE ON WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE OPENS

World Disarmament Conference

LD081015 Moscow TASS in English 0903 GMT 8 Jul 86

[Text] New York July 8 TASS -- A world disarmament conference remains a major element of the efforts to limit and reverse the arms race, primarily the race with nuclear weapons, the U.N. Special Committee for the World Disarmament Conference says in a report. A regular session of the committee opened at the headquarters of the international community. The members of the committee are to approve the report, which will go to the 41st session of the U.N. General Assembly. Delegates point out in their speeches that the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries could provide a good basis for talks at a world disarmament conference on ending the stockpiling of the arms arsenals and on preventing nuclear catastrophe.

Further Report

LD082229 Moscow TASS in English 2144 GMT 8 Jul 86

[Text] New York, July 9 TASS -- TASS correspondent Sergey Baybakov reports:

The socialist countries regard the world conference on disarmament as an important and timely step on the road towards pooling the efforts of the states throughout the world in the name of removing the threat of a nuclear war and curbing the arms race.

The representatives of Hungary, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, speaking at a current session of the U.N. Special Committee for the World Conference on Disarmament here, stressed that this forum could become an important instrument in the cause of practical disarmament. The nuclear age forcefully calls for a new approach to international relations, calls for states with a different social systems to pool their efforts in the name of radically ameliorating the world political climate, said Yevgeniy Golovko, representative of the USSR.

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RELATED ISSUES

KARPOV HOLDS TALKS WITH GENSCHER IN BONN

NST, European Issues Discussed

LD072223 Moscow TASS in English 2206 GMT 7 Jul 86

[Text] Bonn July 7 TASS -- Viktor Karpov, head of the Department on Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament of the USSR Foreign Ministry, was received today by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, West German foreign minister, and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence met West German Government officials dealing with questions of arms limitation and disarmament.

During the consultations held, the sides examined wide ranging problems pertaining to nuclear and space weapons and also the negotiations at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, at the Vienna talks on reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Central Europe and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

Views Summit Preconditions

LD071937 Hamburg DPA in German 1809 GMT 7 Jul 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 7 Jul (DPA) -- Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation to the U.S.-USSR disarmament negotiations in Geneva, today in Bonn stated the preconditions for a new summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and CPSU chief Mikhail Gorbachev. During a news conference at the Soviet Embassy, Karpov said the pre-requisites are a positive atmosphere in U.S.-Soviet relations and a guarantee that there will be practical results regarding one or two issues of space or nuclear arms. These could also include a readiness by the United States to dispense with nuclear weapons tests, following the example of the Soviet Union.

Karpov, who for some time has also been the head of the department for arms control issues in the USSR Foreign Ministry, was in Bonn for disarmament policy consultations at the invitation of the Federal Government. There he met with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and representatives of the FRG Foreign and Defense Ministries. The talks also served as preparation for Genscher's planned visit to Moscow on 20 July.

Karpov said he is "not wholly satisfied" with the results of his consultations. In the Soviet view, the Federal Government's positions at the Stockholm disarmament conference and at the Vienna negotiations on troop reductions (MBFR) are not helpful. Bonn is further complicating U.S.-Soviet negotiations on medium-range weapons with additional demands, Karpov said. However, Karpov expressed confidence that the Geneva negotiations on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons will be successfully concluded this year.

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S ARBATOV ADDRESSES MOSCOW CONFERENCE AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR

AU131258 Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 10 Jun 86 pp 1, 2

[APN report 'specially for SLOWO POWSZECHNE': "A New Way of Thinking--an Essential Condition for Mankind's Survival"]

[Text] The second All-Union Scientists Conference on Problems of Peace and Preventing Nuclear War completed its work in Moscow recently. Apart from Soviet scholars, 140 scholars from 42 other countries and representatives of many scientific establishments also attended. The conference illustrated the maturity and responsibility of scientists for defending the planet against nuclear war. They stressed that the global threat to mankind should be opposed by a global peace strategy. As the first step, the conference adopted an "appeal to learned people of the world."

This is what Georgiy Arbatov, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, told the participants at the meeting:

The most important matter at present is a new way of thinking, an understanding of the fact that basing oneself on old traditions while dealing with the problem of war and peace, and international security, and cultivating traditional views about the strength of a state and the role of weapons, is the surest way to collective suicide. Right now, a new way of thinking and new policy based on this should be regarded as an essential condition for mankind's survival.

Among the practical tasks involved in the struggle for disarmament, stopping nuclear tests assumes first place. This step has several merits.

First, it is capable of disrupting or seriously curtailing qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons and the creation of new nuclear weapons systems. No less important, however, is that stopping nuclear tests would form an effective barrier against the "star wars" program, a key feature of which are x-ray lasers based on nuclear fission.

Second, ceasing these tests is an enormous political value because it is one of the more important ways of building confidence and improving the international situation. I stress once again the fact that the Soviet Union has put forth a unilateral initiative to ban nuclear tests.



Our moratorium has reduced the problem to the level of practical activity and has become a litmus paper, as it were, of the real intentions of both sides. The arguments used by the United States against the cessation of nuclear tests have collapsed one by one. We are aiming toward a real halt to nuclear tests. We are not doing this for propaganda reasons, and are ready to conclude agreements which will suit both sides.

Today, the United States has been forced to reveal the real motives behind its unwillingness to stop nuclear tests. It needs these tests in order to create new weapons systems. It turns out that hundreds, and perhaps even thousands, of detonations are needed for the SDI program. And yet in Reagan's opinion SDI is meant to be a way of completely eliminating nuclear weapons. Now it turns out that this is not quite the case, or, to be more exact, completely not the case. This places the struggle for disarmament on a completely new level.

Third, a ban on nuclear tests may strengthen the resolve not to proliferate nuclear weapons.

Fourth, it is possible in this sphere to work out more effective mechanisms of controlling adherence to agreements, which would be useful from the point of view of the entire issue of restricting and reducing armaments.

All I can say about SDI is that there are attempts to use this system in order to torpedo the entire process of negotiations on the subject of restricting and reducing armaments.

The problem of conventional armaments possesses two aspects. The first is an interdependence between conventional armaments and nuclear disarmament. It is obvious that without the restriction and reduction of conventional weapons it is difficult to expect the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The second aspect has to do with conventional armaments in themselves. We know that 10 million people died in World War I and 55 million in World War II. This means that the destruction potential increased  $5\frac{1}{2}$  times in the space of 20 years. If we analyse this trend, we see that if a world war were to start today, 1.6 billion people could die even without the use of nuclear weapons.

On the one hand, so-called conventional armaments possess a "wonderful" destruction capability similar to that of nuclear weapons. For example, ball-bearing bombs, vacuum bombs, and phosphorus bombs have been constructed, as well as various types of weapons remotely controlled with the help of electronic equipment and laser technology. On the other hand, however, there is already the problem of modern society's increasing dependence on technology, which exacerbates the losses caused by any weapons whatsoever. Europe today cannot afford a war like World War II. One need not mention the numerous nuclear power stations, the bombing or mere strafing of which would be similar to the use of nuclear weapons.



So even if we forget about nuclear weapons, we realize that despite everything, a sword of danger hangs above mankind's head. The problem of survival has probably never been so topical as today.

Hence the strategic importance of the new Soviet disarmament program and new security concept on which this program is based.

In a nuclear age, no state can defend itself solely with the use of military-technological resources, not even with the best possible defense system. Mikhail Gorbachev has already said more than once: "safeguarding security is becoming more and more of a political task and can only be done by political means. What is needed most of all is desire to follow the road of disarmament."

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RELATED ISSUES

CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE URGES ARCTIC DMZ

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 27 Jun 86 p A5

[Article by Jeff Sallot]

[Text]

There is reason to believe that submarines of both the Soviet Union and the United States travel submerged through the Northwest Passage, a special parliamentary committee said yesterday.

It did not, in its year-long study of foreign relations, hear direct evidence confirming submarine activity, the committee said, but it said this must be assumed because of the strategic importance of the Arctic and advances in submarine-launched ballistic missile technology.

To defend Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago, it says in its final report, the federal Government should consider equipping modern submarines of its own for anti-submarine warfare.

"Under present conditions," the all-party committee of 19 senators and MPs said, "if Canada wanted action taken against intruders for any reason, it would have to call on U.S. submarines."

The Conservative Government came under severe criticism last summer for allowing a U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker to travel through

the Northwest Passage without prior acknowledgement by Washington of Canada's claim to the waters. In an effort to blunt the criticism and strengthen Canadian claims to Arctic sovereignty, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced in September that Canada would build a giant \$500-million icebreaker and legislate baseline boundaries.

The committee says the icebreaker will have "little security value (because) satellites or aircraft are more effective for reconnaissance, and aircraft can most quickly dispose of any hostile surface vessel."

Committee co-chairman, Conservative MP Thomas Hockin, was loath to criticize the Government's decision to proceed with the icebreaker, but Liberal Lloyd Axworthy said he was intrigued during his tenure as minister responsible for the Canadian Coast Guard by the idea of building a giant icebreaker "until you asked yourself what it would do."

The report said the committee did not have enough time to decide whether the decision to build an icebreaker was wise.

Canada and other northern countries should try to get the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to declare the Arctic a demilitarized zone, the committee said in the 200-page report that covered all aspects of Canadian foreign policy.

The committee says that if there is not enough money for re-equipping the Canadian military during the next decade, Ottawa should consider scaling back the country's commitments to the North Atlantic alliance.

Other recommendations include:

- Linking foreign aid to performance on human rights. Countries that grossly violate rights should be cut off.
- Toughening border control measures to thwart international terrorists.
- Liberalizing trade. But Ottawa should make sure that any new trade pact with the United States is within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rules for promoting multilateral trade.
- Promoting measures to ease the debt burdens of developing countries.